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‘Smart grid’ is a catch-all term for the smart 
options that could transform the ways society 
produces, delivers and consumes energy, and 
potentially the way we conceive of these services. 
Delivering energy more intelligently will be 
fundamental to decarbonising the UK electricity 
system at least possible cost, while maintaining 
security and reliability of supply.
Smarter energy delivery is expected to allow the 
integration of more low carbon technologies and 
to be much more cost effective than traditional 
methods, as well as contributing to economic 
growth by opening up new business and innovation 
opportunities. Innovating new options for energy 
system management could lead to cost savings of 
up to £10bn, even if low carbon technologies do 
not emerge1. This saving will be much higher if UK 
renewable energy targets are achieved.
Building on extensive expert feedback and input, 
this report describes four smart grid scenarios 
which consider how the UK’s electricity system 
might develop to 2050. The scenarios outline 
how political decisions, as well as those made in 
regulation, finance, technology, consumer and 
social behaviour, market design or response, might 
affect the decisions of other actors and limit or 
allow the availability of future options. The project 
aims to explore the degree of uncertainty around 
the current direction of the electricity system 
and the complex interactions of a whole host of 
factors that may lead to any one of a wide range of 
outcomes. Our addition to this discussion will help 
decision makers to understand the implications 
of possible actions and better plan for the future, 
whilst recognising that it may take any one of a 
number of forms.
Essential smart grid functions
Given the wide range of possible smart grid 
functions that can be enabled via social, technical 
and organisational innovations, the project 
identified essential functions that any future 
UK smart grid must possess. Detailed online 
surveys with over 100 experts emphasised the 
ability to balance a large share of intermittent 
renewable generation as the single most important 
function. Other key functions are closely related. 
For example, increasing the observability and 
controllability of networks is directly related to the 
deployment of demand side response technologies 
which will enable active management. Active 
management of networks will facilitate the 
incorporation of a range of new technologies that 
can contribute further to decarbonisation – for 
example, active loads such as electric vehicles and 
heat pumps.
Scenarios
Each of the four scenarios presented here, 
developed through a lengthy process of mixed-
method engagement with stakeholders, ranging 
from experts to members of the public, describes 
the future development of a smart grid. The way 
in which such a grid may evolve will be highly 
dependent on a range of interactions between 
policy, industry, the wider public and others. 
We present a brief summary of each scenario 
here, along with key drivers and barriers and 
implications for policy.
In the ‘Minimum Smart’ scenario a lack of 
coordination and long-term vision coincides with 
weak consumer acceptance of smart technologies 
and demand side measures. There is, in effect, a 
lack of strong drivers for any meaningful smart 
development. Weaker drivers do exist, however, 
and so there is not a total absence of ‘smartness’, 
Executive Summary
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1 SmartGrid GB (2012) Smart Grid: A Race Worth Winning? London.
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although the preponderance of gas generation 
means there is less of a need for demand side 
flexibility.
In contrast the ‘Groundswell’ scenario sees very 
strong consumer interest in and engagement with 
the energy system, resulting at least partially from 
increased national concern over the declining 
capacity margin and the upward trend in energy 
prices. This eventually causes a radical paradigm 
shift, with rapid growth in community and local 
authority-run electricity generation and even some 
local network management. 
The ‘Smart Power Sector’ scenario, on the other 
hand, is defined by consumers highly resistant to 
changes in the way they use and conceptualise 
energy. The application of smart technologies 
can therefore only really take place ‘behind the 
scenes’, and this means there are limits to what 
can be achieved. Policy and regulatory guidance is 
firm, however, and distribution network operators 
(DNOs) are incentivised to do what they need to do 
when, later in the scenario, high numbers of EVs 
appear and there is significant generation from 
renewables.
‘Smart 2050’ sets the upper boundary for our 
scenarios. Well-coordinated and coherent policy 
action builds strong consumer engagement, 
resulting in a greater number of smart grid-
support services. Engagement differs here from 
the Groundswell scenario in that it is driven by 
policy. Strong coordination and the availability of 
cost-effective options lead to the emergence of a 
different set of technologies and change the nature 
of the smart grid correspondingly.
Key messages
Indicators to measure progress. This report 
demonstrates that diverse outcomes are credible, 
each with very different consequences for 
the achievement of government policy goals. 
Examining the impacts of our ‘wildcards’ reveals 
that there could be critical ‘branching points’ that 
may result in switching between future pathways. 
Ensuring equitable outcomes. Smarter energy 
delivery promises to enable more efficient use of 
energy infrastructure through the introduction of 
differentiated tariffs and demand side response 
programmes. However, our research indicates 
that the distribution of benefits is unlikely to be 
uniform within and across different geographical 
settings.  Due to differences in lifestyles, socio-
economic characteristics, education levels and 
normative constraints, consumers’ ability and 
willingness to accept smart technology and 
services may well vary, even down to a local level. 
How costs and benefits may best be distributed 
to prevent the widening of these differences is an 
area in which further research is required.
Public engagement. The public does appear to 
understand the lifestyle benefits afforded by 
various smart technologies, although there is a 
widespread perception that the risks and/or costs 
of smart grid implementation will be borne by 
consumers, whilst the financial benefits will flow 
to system actors, particularly power companies. 
This perception of the uneven distribution of costs 
and benefits is compounded by the widely-felt 
distrust towards the industry, both of which must 
be overcome if they are not to act as a hindrance to 
smart grid development.
Joined-up thinking across smart systems. Both 
our research and the literature indicate that in 
order for consumers to share their data there 
need to be clear and demonstrable benefits. 
Whilst lower bills may motivate some, others 
may need to experience benefits beyond financial 
savings. One way to build consumer buy-in could 
be via offering integrated services within the 
energy, transport or healthcare domains. Such 
an approach may require the establishment of 
new working relationships and business models 
across the energy industry and within and between 
other sectors, such as the information and 
communications technology (ICT) industry. 
4Expert interviews revealed that the current 
advisory body, the Smart Grid Forum, is a good 
starting point, but that more needs to be done; 
for example, the development of a regulatory 
architecture that removes and addresses 
systemic barriers, and the addition of consumer 
representation in the Forum itself.
Further research could be carried out to further 
the understanding of how smart grids can form the 
foundations of wider smart systems, such as smart 
communities and cities.
Risk, Innovation and Investment. Network 
operators traditionally aim to provide a high-
quality service at minimal cost, and there is 
therefore little scope for innovation. However, the 
challenges posed by smart grids will necessitate 
more risk-taking, which will in turn generate 
learning effects and keep down the costs of finance 
in future. There must therefore be sufficient 
incentivisation of such behaviour, supported by 
cultural changes that encourage innovation at both 
the network operators and the regulator.
No-regrets technology solutions. The possibility 
of widely differing future outcomes raises the 
question of whether there could be some no-
regrets technology solutions that might help 
mitigate uncertainty. For example, the Smart 
Power Sector scenario shows that balancing the 
grid would be more difficult when demand side 
response (DSR) options are not widespread. Bearing 
in mind the long lead times of infrastructure 
investments in the power sector, technologies 
like distributed storage or EV smart charging 
could be used as a part of a mitigation strategy. 
Further work needs to be undertaken in this area 
to identify such technology solutions and develop 
ways to support their commercialisation.
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This chapter introduces the concept of ‘smart 
grids’, discussing what they are and how they can 
help the UK to meet its strategic energy goals. We 
outline the purpose of this report and locate it 
within the existing literature on energy scenarios. 
Finally, we discuss the research methods used to 
develop the scenarios.
1.1 What are smart grids and 
what do they offer?
The UK electricity system is expected to include 
growing volumes of intermittent generation, 
such as wind and solar energy. More generation 
is expected to occur in homes and businesses 
and new technologies such as heat pumps and 
electric vehicles (EVs) may also lead to much 
higher demand. The way in which networks have 
operated in the past is unlikely to manage the new 
stresses these changes will bring in an effective 
way, and trying to do so is likely to lead to much 
higher system costs and possibly reductions in the 
reliability of electrical supply.
‘Smart grids’ may include or enable advances such 
as smarter meters, new kinds of power company, 
time-of-use tariffs and new technologies for use 
on the networks. These advances will allow low 
carbon technologies to be used more effectively, 
reducing network costs and protecting quality 
of supply. Taken together smarter grids are a key 
enabling technology in efforts to decarbonise 
the UK’s electricity system at least possible cost 
and while maintaining security of supply. Smart 
grids can vary widely in nature but are generally 
understood to include the many technological 
and non-technological options that may change 
the way society generates, delivers and consumes 
energy.
There is currently no widely accepted definition 
of the term ‘smart grid’, with definitions varying 
across working groups and countries [1]. Some 
commentators consider smart grids in terms of 
technology alone, some as being purely about 
innovation on the demand side, while others take a 
broader view of the potential for smartness in the 
wider system. All these definitions refer to different 
functions and capabilities that may be supported 
by smart grids. 
This variation reflects the fact that smart grids, 
as an application, bring together different 
components of the energy system, including: its 
technology and infrastructure characteristics; 
the supply mix; data availability, access and 
type; regulatory and market frameworks; policy 
incentives and their effectiveness; consumer 
capability and willingness to engage. As a result 
of the interactions between these factors, various 
functions might be enabled or disabled in different 
markets. A broad and commonly-used definition 
comes from the Smart Grids European Technology 
Platform [2], where smart grids are defined as 
’electricity networks that can intelligently integrate 
the behaviour and actions of all users connected to 
it – generators, consumers and those that do both – 
in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic 
and secure electricity supplies.’
Given the lengthy lead times for investment in 
energy infrastructure, the multi-decadal lifespan 
of network assets, and the combined consequences 
of technological lock-in, learning effects and 
economies of scale, decisions taken today are likely 
to impact strongly on the options available to 
policymakers far into the future.
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1.2 Purpose of this report
Using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and drawing on a range 
of disciplines and stakeholder engagement, this 
project aimed to:
• Identify key steps likely to determine the future 
shape of smart grids at the upstream level, 
together with socio-economic, behavioural, 
technological and environmental factors 
influencing the uptake of technologies at the 
end user level, and
• Develop a range of smart grid scenarios, and 
subsequently evaluate and refine these through 
expert and public workshops, with particular 
attention paid to:
 Ō critical branching points within each 
scenario, and
 Ō spatial differences within the UK energy 
system.
Scenarios provide a strong tool for organising 
economic, technological, competitive, political, and 
societal information into a framework for decision-
making [3]. The interdisciplinary nature of smart 
grids and the interplay of the multiple complex 
factors that will shape their emergence, make a 
scenario approach well-suited for analysing and 
informing smart grid development.
Previous scenarios have highlighted social, 
economic, policy, and technological drivers of 
change within the energy sector (see section 1.3). 
However, little work has been done to examine 
the roles and priorities of different actors [4], 
spatial variation (e.g. urban vs. rural, existing 
energy infrastructure) or behavioural issues. This 
project incorporates these essential dimensions 
into scenarios that focus specifically on smart 
grids. We include stakeholders’ assessments of the 
uncertainties and key dimensions associated with 
smart grid development.
1.3 Background 
We conducted a detailed review of the 
interdisciplinary smart grid literature; further 
details can be found in our Literature Review 
report [5]. There are a number of stakeholder 
(DECC Carbon Plan [6], National Grid [7], CCC 2008 
[8], Smart Grid Forum Scenarios [9]) and academic 
(Transition Pathways [10], Tyndall [11], Supergen 
[12], UKERC Energy 2050 [13]) scenarios addressing 
the transition to a low carbon energy system in the 
UK. However, the development of smart grids goes 
beyond the wider energy system, encompassing, 
for example, policy, regulatory and commercial 
frameworks, market conditions, and data access 
and security concerns. The majority of existing 
scenarios have been developed using optimisation 
models in order to construct a pathway to a given 
future goal (i.e. backcasting). Little attention has 
been paid to behavioural issues other than forcing 
some constraints in the models.
Our scenarios adopt a system perspective by 
considering political, regulatory, commercial, 
financial, behavioural, organisational and technical 
interdependencies. We pay particular attention 
to key branching points [10] (where particular 
events may force or enable switching from one 
possible smart grid pathway to another, such as 
public resistance or political change) rather than 
mere end points from the present day to 2050. A 
distinctive feature of our scenarios is their ‘socio-
technical’ nature, i.e. their focus on how social 
and technical systems interact [14]. They explore 
the future by examining how certain events can 
influence the range of options available. They do 
not attempt to quantify the levels of technology 
penetration in each scenario. The upper and lower 
limits for each technology are broadly aligned with 
the most recent public data available from the 
Smart Grid Forum scenarios [9] (for a more detailed 
discussion see Section 5.2).
These scenarios are neither forecasts nor 
predictions, and are not meant to imply any 
probabilities regarding the various futures 
presented. Rather, they are intended to represent 
plausible and internally-consistent views of the 
energy system in order to illuminate the many 
interactions that will shape its development, and 
so contribute towards mitigating uncertainty about 
the future. Whilst we identify branching points 
from one scenario to another, our analysis reveals 
that certain actions might limit available options 
in the future.
By signposting key decisions and their implications 
across the wider socio-technical system, we 
hope our scenarios will help decision-makers 
(whether in policy, industry or business) avoid any 
unintended consequences, given the significant 
costs and benefits of smart grid technologies and 
the challenges ahead.
UKERC Research Report
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1.4  Research methods
The project followed a ‘mixed-method’ approach, 
building on existing literature, but generating new 
data through extensive stakeholder engagement. 
The project was carried out in two work packages: 
1) data collection and 2) scenario development. 
Both work packages involved extensive stakeholder 
engagement (Table 1), via an expert Project 
Advisory Group, expert interviews, online Policy 
Delphi surveys (Box 1), an expert workshop and 
public workshops. Stakeholders included experts 
in the field of smart grids (and related areas, e.g. 
consumer behaviour), communities with relevant 
experience (e.g. electric vehicles, microgeneration), 
as well as members of the general public.
The Policy Delphi surveys focused on identifying 
critical technical, social and policy aspects of 
smart grids. We developed an online survey tool 
for anonymised collection of opinions of relevant 
academic, industry, policy and the third sector 
smart grid experts. 
The first survey round asked about expected 
benefits and pitfalls, functions, and barriers, and 
involved 77 experts (46 male, 31 female). Around 
half were academics and network operators, 
with the remainder spanning policymakers, 
communities with smart grid experience, 
suppliers/generators, interest groups, consultants 
and others. The second round expanded on the 
expected functions of smart grids identified in the 
first round. The same group of experts was invited 
to participate; this time 44 (30 male, 14 female) 
completed the survey.
Finally, public workshops were convened to explore 
attitudes to smart grids and acceptability of our 
draft scenarios. Four workshops were convened in 
a range of locations with diverse samples (Table 
1). In sub-groups of 5-7 people, participants were 
first asked about their energy use, what appliances 
and devices they used, and if they thought about 
their energy consumption at all. The four scenarios 
were then presented as a typical daily routine of 
someone living in 2050, and reactions elicited.
Box 1.  The Policy Delphi Method
Several projects have used Delphi (or variants, such as Policy Delphi [15]) methods to elicit 
stakeholder and/or expert views on energy system futures (e.g. EurEnDel; UK Foresight; SuperGen 
[16, 17]). Not all energy scenarios are developed through Delphi-type techniques but its advantages 
include the ability to capture a range of expert (and potentially non-expert) views on a topic where 
the field is young (with little published literature), rapidly developing, controversial and/or where 
long-range predictions are required.
The Policy Delphi approach uses an iterative method in which there are several (usually two or three) 
‘rounds’ of consultation, and participants are typically shown the results from the previous round 
to respond to (often by providing a revised response) and potentially reach a consensus. Data is 
collected anonymously so that participants can provide their views in an uninhibited fashion and are 
not tempted to follow the opinion of established figures in their area, eliminating stakeholder bias.
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Table 1. Research and stakeholder engagement methods
Method
Sample 
Size
Timing Participants Aims
Report 
Section
Policy 
Advisory 
Group
12 Every 6 
Months
Experts involved in smart 
grids (Ofgem, National 
Grid, DNOs, suppliers, 
technology companies, NGOs, 
academics).
To guide project on key smart 
grid issues, data collection 
and scenario development.
n/a
Expert 
Interviews
18 Feb-Mar 
2012
Experts involved in smart 
grids and related issues 
(the UK Government, 
Ofgem, National Grid, 
DNOs, consultants, trade 
associations and NGOs).
To reveal as much of the 
landscape as possible to 
ensure no key element was 
omitted from the Policy 
Delphi expert survey.
2.1
Policy 
Delphi 
(Online 
Surveys)
Round 1: 
77
Apr 
2012
21 academics, 12 network 
operators, 6 consultants, 5 
interest groups, 5 suppliers, 
3 communities with SG 
experience, 3 policy-makers, 
1 generator, 1 regulator, and 7 
‘other’ (13 no response).
To identify critical technical, 
social and policy aspects of 
smart grids via a two-stage 
anonymous online survey 
tool.
2.2
Round 2: 
44
Sep 
2012
11 academics, 11 network 
operators, 4 suppliers, 2 
interest groups, 1 regulator, 1 
generator, 1 policy-maker, and 
13 ‘other’.
Expert 
Workshop
20 May 
2013
Academic, industry, policy 
and third sector smart grid 
experts.
To feedback on draft 
scenarios and pathways.
2.3
Public 
Workshop
53 Sep-Oct 
2013
Four locations: two urban 
(Cardiff, Brixton) and two 
rural (Fintry, Mere Green); 
two with smart grid-
related experience (e.g. 
microgeneration) and two 
without.
To explore public attitudes 
to smart grid issues and 
responses to draft scenarios 
via structured participatory 
exercises.
4.1
51% male; range of age 
groups, education levels and 
household characteristicsi.
i Range of household and home types: 20.8% single-adult households, 52.8% live with one other adult, 62.3% do not have 
children at home; 49% semi-detached or detached house, 20.8% flat; mean home age: 62 years; 86.8% have internet at 
home; 41.5% own their house outright, with most of the remainder having a mortgage.
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This chapter presents the research findings from a 
series of in-depth interviews and a policy Delphi, 
and introduces the methodology employed for the 
construction of a small number of sociotechnical 
scenarios.
2.1 Smart grid landscape
This section describes the findings from the expert 
interviews, designed in order to identify the main 
themes to be explored and incorporated into the 
scenarios.
Predictability and uncertainty
The problem of predictability arose in a significant 
number of interviews, most commonly in regard 
to distribution networks, issues arising from 
the replacement of RPI-Xii  with RIIOiii, and the 
uncertain needs of the electricity system. Many 
stakeholders felt uncertainty over how the 
potentially significant expansion of new energy 
technologies will shape the network and make it 
difficult to make definitive assessments, even over 
the next decade (relating directly to the 2015-2023 
operating period of RIIO-ED1). No-one felt able 
to properly evaluate network needs or possible 
evolution beyond 2025, making it challenging to 
outline scenarios beyond 2030. This throws up the 
question of how regulation would need to evolve 
alongside developing technology and market 
services. Experience suggests that this would have 
to take into account the changing circumstances 
on an ongoing basis.
There is also considerable uncertainty in the 
medium to longer term:
• How do we move to more sophisticated 
systems and who pays for those?
• What will the demands on the system be after 
2020, and how do we stay ahead of and fulfil 
these system demands?
• How will regulation evolve with technology and 
market services?
• How to give signals which allow flexibility 
beyond the end of the 2023 distribution 
price control review and provide sufficient 
information to allow DNOs to make decisions 
about post-2023 investment?
• Might a flexibility mechanism/review 
mechanism in RIIO-ED1 be a necessity once we 
have more information about how things work 
in practice?
The results of most Low Carbon Networks Fundiv  
projects will not be available until after RIIO-ED1 
starts, so there will be limited data about feasibility 
to inform its introduction. It is possible some 
benefits of RIIO might only really become apparent 
in practice, but so might the pitfalls.
Planning and investment by DNOs
Stakeholders agreed that previous assumptions 
about the network no longer held true and DNOs 
would have to respond differently. The change 
to the regulatory system for DNOs creates a new 
operational environment; DNOs will have a far 
more complex task and require more interaction 
than has been the case.
Since their privatisation, DNOs have tended 
to be conservative, low-risk and low-return. 
Research and development (R&D) investment fell 
dramatically as a result of regulatory incentives to 
minimise costs. DNOs will need to take more risks 
in adapting to the new realities of the system. More 
innovation will be required, adding considerably 
to costs, and requiring a bigger return. Risk 
management will become a key element of their 
overall management strategy and it is possible 
some will respond less capably to these challenges.
DNOs will need to trade off primary assets (e.g. 
wires) against more advanced control and it is 
likely that the balance of this trade-off will change 
over time, with important implications for effective 
regulation. The level of risk that Ofgem will tolerate 
will also be significant in future distribution price 
ii Retail Price Index, excluding mortgage interest payments
iii Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs: A performance based model for setting the network companies’ price 
controls by the regulator Ofgem
iv Ofgem set up the Low Carbon Networks (LCN) Fund as part of the electricity distribution price control that runs until 
31 March 2015. The LCN Fund allows up to £500m to support projects sponsored by the Distribution Network Operators 
(DNOs) to try out new technology, operating and commercial arrangements.
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control reviews. There is potential conflict between 
Ofgem’s perspective on allowable risk and the 
direction the DNOs (and transmission networks) 
want to take, either collectively or individually. This 
may constrain innovation.
Linked to this is the issue of whether Ofgem would 
allow investment ahead of need, and if so, to 
what extent. A conservative response from Ofgem 
could decelerate innovation and limit appetite for 
risk. It was generally agreed that Ofgem would 
prefer to see third parties involved in innovation 
on distribution networks, partnering with DNOs. 
While this has value in terms of offsetting risk it 
might also mean a complex double sales process 
with no guarantee of return.
Another issue for stakeholders was when 
development should begin – in 2015, 2023 or 
somewhere in between? There are some key low 
carbon technologies which will present serious 
challenges for the current electricity system. Rapid 
expansion of even one of these could require 
significant changes. Effective system operation 
will depend on how fast DNOs can respond.  Thus, 
a key question regarding investment and smart 
grid development was whether to include smarter 
technology ahead of the curve or go slowly to 
reduce costs and try to react quickly to sudden 
change (e.g. EV uptake). Given the new DNO 
incentives, much will depend on how they respond 
in terms of forward planning.
At the time of writing, six DNOs have been 
considered for fast-tracking under RIIO-ED1 with 
only one being successfulv. Since fast-tracking was 
seen as an attractive incentive by the experts we 
interviewed, this may reflect problems for DNOs in 
understanding what would be required from them 
or being unable or unwilling to meet the criteria.
Supply sector
Suppliers’ concerns were more focussed on the 
impact of increased transmission and distribution 
costs on bills. They were less worried about 
demand management as long as power stays 
on. This is significant, since suppliers have the 
potential to take a leading role in addressing 
demand amongst consumers, due to their 
relationship with the consumer.
Coordination
One fairly common concern was a perceived lack 
of vision in planning for smarter energy delivery 
beyond 2020, and a desire for more coordination 
was often expressed. Many stakeholders thought 
the Smart Grid Forum was a step in the right 
direction but that more coordination would be 
needed, with the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) singled out as needing to 
provide a coherent lead.
Local grid issues
In the past, assumptions about technologies 
such as EVs and heat pumps were that they 
would be evenly distributed, but DNOs now think 
high concentrations in specific areas are more 
likely (e.g. EVs in London or ground-source heat 
pumps in areas off the gas grid). This will require 
development of smart grids on a ‘hotspot’ basis, 
with multiple implications. Where clustering 
occurs in areas with little system headroom there 
is greater likelihood of problems. The lack of 
information which DNOs currently have on rural 
networks and the lack of flexibility inherent in 
them may need more work to justify the precise 
scale of the problem. ‘Hotspot’ development will 
mean variable levels of smartness across energy 
networks; thus the degree of smartness may vary 
strongly on a geographical basis.
Smart meter rollout
A substantial number of stakeholders were 
concerned about the limits of the smart meter 
rollout planned for 2016-19 and its enabling 
communications system. Many outlined the 
problems of the supplier-led smart meter rollout 
and the conflicting supplier priority of minimising 
costs and the DNO desire to enhance functionality.
Views differed as to when and how smart meters, 
which go beyond the smartness of the initial 
rollout models, would be needed.
v For more information please see: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/riio-ed1-business-plan-assess-
ment-and-fast-tracked-consultation
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This will depend both on the smartness of the 
typical meter installed and the rapidity with 
which their limits are reached. It is unclear 
whether demand for particular data will lead to 
any upgrading as a result of the broken value 
chain. The move to more advanced meters may 
eventually be limited by the longevity of the 
initially rolled out meters.
There was concern over the quality of the 
communications system being introduced to 
gather data from smart meters. Some stakeholders 
felt that DECC’s budgeting would mean severe 
limits on bandwidth, meaning little potential to 
expand beyond simple meter reading, regardless of 
the functionality of the meters. Many felt a second 
generation communication system might have to 
be introduced relatively quickly.
Consumer engagement
There was considerable uncertainty about the level 
of consumer engagement that will emerge, and 
industry stakeholders (e.g. DNOs) seem unlikely to 
act on data estimating levels of engagement unless 
it comes with a high degree of certainty (e.g. from 
real world data). Non-engagement may limit the 
options available to DNOs, new entrants to the UK 
electricity supply industry, such as Distribution 
System Operators (DSOs), and for overall system 
balancing.
Issues such as access to data, time-of-use tariffs, 
smart-enabled domestic goods and willingness 
to shift energy usage will impact substantially 
on the ability of other stakeholders to provide 
new services and apply new methods to system 
management. This presents a potential ‘chicken-
and-egg’ scenario, which could limit uptake of 
more advanced consumer-related services unless 
action is taken to open up markets.
Skills shortages
Several stakeholders mentioned a skills shortfall 
amongst power companies. There was doubt as to 
whether human resources departments were ready 
to respond to the changing situation regarding 
their organisations’ skills. Power electronics and 
telecommunication skills were cited as necessities, 
alongside modelling expertise for DNOs.
Concern was also expressed that DNOs may have 
sufficient skills to handle Low Carbon Networks 
Fund projects but not to roll out knowledge gained 
more widely.
2.2 Smart grid drivers, barriers 
and functionalities
Building on the expert interviews, our two-stage 
Policy Delphi online survey explored in more 
detail smart grid benefits, pitfalls, drivers, barriers 
and functionalities as elucidated by experts and 
stakeholders. Findings from the Policy Delphi 
survey are summarised in this section.
Benefits and pitfalls of smart grids
Broadly, experts agreed on the need to make 
electrical delivery smarter, and that smart grids 
can afford various benefits. Cost reductions were 
the most cited expected benefit, while investment 
risk was the most cited pitfall of smart grids (Box 
2). Experts expect that smart grids will deliver 
significant cost reductions for the grid, via deferred 
investment, efficiency savings, or otherwise, 
provided that the costs of implementation and 
maintenance of the required technologies can be 
met.
 
Yet not all the solutions involved in making 
the grid smarter were viewed favourably, with 
a measurable proportion of experts finding 
them unproven, underdeveloped, complex and 
difficult to implement. The expected benefits of 
a functional smart grid involve facilitation of 
renewable energy, better network balancing, and 
emissions reduction – all of which are high on 
government energy and climate agendas. However, 
customer protection (e.g. against price rises) was 
not generally seen as an important functionality. 
Rather, economic and technical benefits seemed to 
be prioritised over social ones.
At the same time, consumer engagement, 
community involvement, the potential for demand 
management but also potential resistance to it, 
were also identified as both potential benefits and 
pitfalls. Data protection and privacy was clearly 
identified as a problematic aspect inherent to 
smart grids, demanding greater transparency and 
data protection safeguards to gain customer trust.
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Drivers and barriers of smart grids
We explored drivers and barriers to smart grids 
within the following areas:
Standards and technical issues. Smart metering 
and communications are paramount here; more 
specifically, the need for standardisation of 
metering functionality, communication protocols 
and technologies to drive a smarter grid, as well 
as effective device rollout. Other issues deemed 
crucial for smart grids include active network 
monitoring, the method and timing of devices’ 
communication with each other and with the 
network, and particularly the way data is shared 
and stored. In addition there was an array of lower-
priority issues such as the capacity of networks to 
support EVs.
Data handling. Data protection, security, and 
privacy guarantees emerged as the key issues here. 
Concerns around cyber security, the willingness 
of companies to share data with each other and 
with the network, and then the security of this 
data once collected and/or shared are all likely 
to have a substantial impact on customer trust 
and cooperation. Other issues raised included 
the minimum level of transparency to make data 
useful to companies, and the limits of what energy 
providers may be able to do with this data.
Market structure, regulation, and coordination between 
DECC and Ofgem. In contrast to the technical 
areas above, there was less agreement here on 
the priority drivers/barriers, exposing a broad 
spectrum of policy and regulatory topics.
One recurrent theme was fragmentation of the 
energy system and markets, with players at many 
levels either having conflicting interests or lacking 
clearly defined responsibilities, resulting in inertia 
in the system and calls for restructuring. Another 
recurrent theme was consistency and coordination 
between market players and in policy and 
regulation, so that clear and consistent messages 
(including a long-term vision and commitment to 
change) are communicated to the market.
Customer engagement. This area included the clear 
communication of potential smart grid benefits to 
consumers and the understanding of consumer 
responses to smart grid capabilities (e.g. shifting 
consumption to off-peak) and associated changes 
(e.g. pricing, customer-tailored solutions). 
Investment. Risk aversion was seen as the most 
important barrier and the most important pitfall 
(Box 2). Uncertainty of return on investment and 
about government commitment and regulation 
are a financially unattractive combination; this 
limits willingness to fund any changes on the 
grid, for fear that broader changes may not be 
implemented, or that implementation may not last 
long enough for investments to return profits.
Functions of smart grids
Next, we examined potential and expected 
functions of smart grids and whether these were 
essential, desirable or not important. From a list 
of 20 potential functions of smart grids, identified 
from previous research, and to which experts could 
add further functions, five were chosen as essential 
by over 70% of experts (Table 2) and were not voted 
‘not important’ by any respondents.
The top-cited expected benefits from smart grids were (% of experts):
• Cost reduction in different levels of the system (39%)
• Improved efficiency in generation, delivery and use of assets (39%)
• Facilitation of renewable energy sources of electricity (24%)
• Emissions reductions (24%)
The top-cited expected pitfalls of smart grids were (% of experts):
• Costs or lacking/risky investment (42%)
• Disengaged or uncooperative customers (27%)
• Complexity or difficult-to-manage solutions (21%)
• Data protection/privacy concerns (18%)
Box 2. Expert opinion on the benefits and pitfalls of smart grids (open-ended survey 
question)
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Few significant differences by background or 
gender were found (although ‘To protect vulnerable 
consumers from price increases’, was seen as 
essential more by social scientists and engineers 
than by business or ‘other’ sector respondents).
We then examined the interdependency and 
spatial aspects (i.e. critical prerequisite steps 
and geographical differences) of these top five 
functions, along with energy storage (the most 
popular ‘other’ option freely proposed by the 
survey participants). Given its potential for 
reducing the need for any of the other functions of 
a smart grid, energy storage may also be identified 
as a potential branching point for smart grid 
development.
With the exception of function 2, where the 
installation of monitoring and control equipment 
was clearly prioritised, followed by smart meters 
(for monitoring and perhaps control at a domestic 
level) there was generally a wide spread of opinions 
on what constitutes prerequisite steps for each 
function. These included addressing generation 
forecasting and DSR for function 1, smart meter 
installation and customer acceptance (function 
3), installing monitoring, metering and control 
technology, and resolving responsibilities among 
energy market players (function 4).
Of the six functions, four were expected to be 
implemented either through trials gradually 
being connected to the grid, or in parts of the 
network that are in critical need (Figure 1). In 
contrast, function 3 (deployment of demand 
side technologies) was primarily expected to be 
implemented by rollout, with local trials as a 
second option; and function 5 (integration of active 
loads) was equally expected to occur via local trials 
to be connected gradually, and on an ad hoc basis.
In terms of likelihood of implementation, all 
functions were judged as likely to be implemented, 
albeit to a low or moderate extent (Figure 2). 
There was no negative expectation for any of the 
functions, reinforcing their perceived importance. 
The most likely functions expected to be 
implemented were observability and controllability 
of the grid (function 2), followed by integration of 
active loads (function 5). Facilitating energy storage 
(function 6) received the lowest likelihood ratings, 
perhaps reflecting our assumption of storage being 
a branching point in smart grid development.
In terms of spatial variation, there was an 
expectation that virtually all functions would be 
more likely to be implemented in urban settings 
than in rural ones; this was particularly the case 
for DSR technologies, active load management, and 
controllability (Figure 2).
Table 2. Essential smart grid functions
Function % of expertsrating ‘essential’
1. To balance a power grid with a large share of intermittent renewable generation 82
2. To increase observability and controllability of the power grid 75
3. To enable deployment of demand side response technologies 74
4. To enable active network management 73
5. To allow integration of active loads (e.g. electric vehicles, heat pumps) 71
6. To facilitate energy storage* 12
* This was the most popular unprompted function offered freely by the survey participants
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Figure 1. Expected method of implementing each function*
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Figure 2. Expected likelihood of implementing each function in different geographical contexts
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2.3 Scenario pathways and their 
plausibility
We used the Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) 
method of scenario development in this study [18]. 
This approach is highly structured and transparent 
and, unlike many scenario development exercises, 
does not constrain outcomes to a certain number 
of scenarios. FAR is able to take into account many 
more factors than a twin-axis framework and 
analyse their combinations systematically to gain 
insight into how the pathways branch out into the 
future.
By analysing the subject area, we identified key 
dimensions (or ‘sectors’), such as government 
policy, and three or four alternative futures within 
each sector (known as ‘factors’). In the case of 
government policy, for example, these may be 
strong or weak policy support for low carbon 
technologies (LCTs). Full descriptions of the seven 
sectors are given in Box 3.
The sectors identified, as in Figure 3, were laid 
out in a 7x4 sector/factor array, titled MUDSPIN, 
after the first letter of each sector. Every factor in 
the matrix was then compared with every other 
factor and rated from -3 to 3 based on the pair’s 
consistency. These ratings were discussed and 
agreed upon by pairs of project team members and 
reviewed by the team as a whole.
The Parmenides EIDOS™ software package was 
used to calculate the consistency rating of each 
combination (made up of average pairwise ratings) 
and to rank the most consistent combinations. 
These were then checked for contradictions, 
and empirical and normative constraints. The 
surviving combinations were grouped together 
to form similar clusters which could conceivably 
move from one combination to another – the most 
subjective element of the process – which were 
in turn then ordered into an intuitive sequence of 
‘can I see this world leading to that one?’ [18].
This process resulted in a sequence of events, 
branching out into the future in a tree-like diagram 
(Figure 4), to which we then applied the earlier 
findings to give richer detail. By assessing and 
evaluating different combinations, these pathways 
were developed into four scenarios.
 
The plausibility of different pathways for each 
scenario and their coherence and timescales 
were discussed at the expert workshop, revealing 
a range of issues and considerable divergence of 
opinion (especially in relation to new technologies 
and associated measures). We outline findings that 
had the most impact upon subsequent scenario 
development.
Policy and regulation. There was a strong feeling 
amongst participants that RIIO and Electricity 
Market Reform would be central to many of 
the initiatives that would determine the overall 
smartness of future energy delivery – in the 
short term at least. In the longer term, network 
smartness is likely to be driven by the generation 
mix, and therefore policy measures designed 
to encourage or discourage certain types of 
generation will have significant impact on the way 
in which networks will develop over the coming 
decades. Given the central focus of RIIO and 
EMR, government uncertainty is seen as being, 
by far, the greatest risk and the most substantial 
barrier. Government actions are therefore a driver 
and a barrier to smart grid development. As the 
government has many, often competing, objectives 
and concerns, other than environmental ones, that 
may have an impact on network smartness. 
Box 3. Smart grid scenario sectors
Markets The extent to which new energy services emerge
Users Both the overall level of demand and its flexibility
Data & Information The availability of data from smart meters and substations
Supply Mix The defining characteristics of the power generation system
Policy The strength of government support for low carbon technologies
Investment Conditions The investment and regulatory context
Networks The extent of smart technology implementation by networks
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For example, if supply security drives greater 
gas generation, then supply side flexibility may 
negate much of the need for advanced DSR 
technologies (though there may still be system 
and cost benefits from having some DSR). Further, 
since policy is formulated and implemented at a 
national level, incentives for DNOs to act in certain 
ways are likely to lead to a degree of uniformity 
(or similarity) in DNO behaviour. Similarly, 
local/community or regional communications 
infrastructure is unlikely to develop in place of a 
system co-ordinated at a national level. However, 
this is not to say that subnational actors do not 
have a role to play: it was felt in some cases that 
local authority involvement in the energy system 
could affect network development.
RIIO. Many participants recognised that RIIO failing 
to achieve any meaningful change is a possible 
outcome. Some highlighted the ‘cliff-edge’ for 
commercial actors trying to attract new customers; 
because regulation starts once they have more 
than a certain number, there is an incentive 
either to remain small or become very big very 
quickly. There was also discussion around how the 
outcome of RIIO should be regarded. Participants 
agreed that it should not be seen simply as smart 
vs. not-smart – instead the question is whether 
RIIO provides enough of a stimulus to sufficiently 
incentivise DNOs to seek out new behaviours, 
leading to three plausible outcomes: RIIO 
stimulates change as intended, less than intended, 
or not at all.
Figure 3. Smart grid scenario sectors and factors
• Low increase in demand, passive consumers
• High increase in demand, passive consumers
• Low increase in demand, active consumers
• High increase in demand, active consumers
• Billing information only, plus basic 
network data
• Aggregated historical data only
• Aggregated near to real-time data 
available
• Disaggregated near to real-time data 
available
• Low growth in NES, existing actors
• Low growth in NES, new actors
• High growth in NES, existing actors
• High growth in NES, new actors
• Characterised by inflexible 
generation
• Characterised by flexible generation
• Characterised by variable generation
• Weak incentives with no coordination of SED
• Strong incentives with no coordination of SED
• Weak incentives with coordination of SED
• Strong incentives with coordination of SED
• Passive DN management
• Partially active DN management
• Fully active DN management
Markets
Policy
Data and Information
Supply Mix
Users
Networks
• Expensive capital with obstructive REF
• Cheap capital with obstructive REF
• Expensive capital with constructive REF
• Cheap capital with constructive REF
Investment Conditions
Legend
  Smart grids with different 
functions and capabilities
DN Distribution Network
NES New Energy-related Services
REF Regulatory Investment Framework
SED Smarter Energy Delivery
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Figure 4. The Faustian Tree
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Technological. The effectiveness of policy measures 
designed to encourage or discourage certain 
types of generation were perceived as having 
a significant impact on how networks will 
develop (see Policy/Regulatory above). Different 
conceptions of smartness were also raised. In 
keeping with our Smart Power Sector scenario, the 
first is a high level of smartness on the generation 
and supply side (e.g. including storage and large 
amounts of interconnection to mainland Europe) 
and sees smart metering succeeding in engaging 
consumers in greater numbers (see Consumers, 
below).
Such a system may be very smart on the 
generation side in rural areas (with advanced 
monitoring and control systems) but less smart 
in consumption, which may, for example, be 
restricted to key technologies such as EVs rather 
than widespread adoption of DSR-relevant 
products in customers’ homes. There was an 
extremely wide range of opinions on when certain 
technologies may be introduced. Estimates 
placed the emergence of both grid-scale storage 
and the advent of residential real-time pricing 
over a twenty year timeframe. This is consistent 
with psychological research on difficulties 
conceptualising the future [19].
Finance. There was some observation that the 
cost of capital could be largely irrelevant for any 
scenario. There is currently cheap capital available 
but very little investment, due to regulatory and 
policy uncertainty. Additionally, DNOs are currently 
able to access debt at low cost because they are 
low risk. Requiring them to take on more risk (as 
expected via the changes in pricing mechanisms, 
i.e. RIIO) may adversely affect their risk profiles 
from the point of view of investors, thus increasing 
the costs of financing any smart investments.
Consumers. There was a very strong concern, 
regularly expressed, that consumers will 
be unlikely to play a very active role in the 
development of smart grids until quite a late stage 
in the scenarios. It was felt that regulation, rather 
than pressure from consumers, would drive the 
behaviour of DNOs. However, it was suggested that 
if consumers do become active, they are unlikely 
to return to passivity. There were questions around 
the description of consumers becoming ‘active’; 
this might be better expressed by asking what 
types of services they will use. A radical alternative 
to this conception of the consumer’s role is that of 
a ‘consumer-only’ smart system, in which there is 
less smart generation and supply but end users, 
predominantly in urban areas (and not only in the 
domestic sector), have become smarter in how they 
use energy. Despite the generally-anticipated lack 
of consumer involvement, it was the view of most 
participants that more advanced smart meters will 
achieve significant penetration around 2025 as the 
old ones will need replacing. This will be a market, 
rather than a policy decision, so will happen 
regardless.
Markets. There was a general view expressed by 
one group that entrepreneurial activity is likely to 
occur in niches and that how this is managed or 
encouraged, and how new techniques emerge into 
wider use, is a question for competition policy as 
well as regulation.
A particular concern was raised that despite 
being incentivised by the network innovation 
programmes to trial new technologies, DNOs might 
lack the incentives (or the skills) to roll out these 
technologies further. New companies may expand 
and remain independent, or they may be bought 
up by dominant players and either nurtured or 
stifled. The latter might affect transition to greater 
smartness by limiting the competition in the 
market. This progress could well depend on the 
degree to which incumbents choose to adopt and 
explore new technologies.
Box 4. Active and passive networks
‘Passive’ distribution networks mostly have 
power only flowing to the consumer. 
‘Active’ networks may have micro, small or 
medium scale generators, and residential 
customers with higher loads (e.g. an EV). 
Active networks need real-time monitoring 
and management, but offer opportunities for 
an increased range of services to consumers. 
They may offer improved operational 
security through increased levels of 
automation.
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Scenarios. With regard to specific feedback for the 
scenarios presented to the group, it was suggested 
that the Smart Power Sector and Smart 2050 might 
in fact be very similar up until roughly the year 
2030, after which they would diverge due to the 
absence of consumer engagement. Some felt the 
regulator is unlikely to act unless levels of EVs, 
heat pumps and renewables become significant, 
because very smart networks simply will not be 
needed otherwise. It was felt that ‘partially’ active 
networks therefore serve no purpose. 
Prior to the workshop our Minimum Smart 
scenario had contained high volumes of nuclear 
generation towards 2050. Experts felt this would 
in fact drive more smart and ancillary services 
and so looks out of place in 2050. It has therefore 
been removed, although it was recognised that 
it is possible for more nuclear to appear later 
than 2050, and that if this were the case, nuclear 
adoption could act as a branching point. For 
example, new reactor designs and additional 
smart services would mean that we might as well 
continue down that pathway. It was also noted that 
a pathway characterised by inflexible generation 
is less plausible, as by the time nuclear power 
plants are built there would be a similar amount of 
variable generation.
Finally, there was agreement that more work was 
needed on the market structure dimension within 
the Groundswell scenario; in particular, closer 
examination of how the broken value chain might 
be addressed in order to encourage better and 
more rapid innovation, which is highly unlikely 
to occur without an adequate profit motive, and 
is a direct consequence of the lack of competition 
within the market.
 
Box 5. Ancillary services
A range of services necessary to the efficient 
running of the electricity system that are 
outside the basic needs of generating and 
delivering power. Some of these (such as 
regulation and reactive power) are required 
during normal operations to maintain the 
necessary balance between generation and 
load in real time and maintain voltages 
within the required ranges. Other ancillary 
services (such as contingency reserves) 
provide insurance against minor problems 
becoming catastrophes. Finally, black start 
services are required to restore the bulk-
power system to normal operations after a 
major outage.
Smart Grid Scenarios
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This chapter presents the scenarios in narrative 
form, as they were developed following a lengthy 
data collection process. Each of the four scenarios 
is described in detail, followed by discussion of how 
it is possible to move between scenarios, and the 
impact of wildcards.
In Figure 4, each scenario building block 
corresponds to a combination of MUDSPIN 
sector/factor array choices. Scenario narratives 
were developed in order to describe the most 
influential characteristics, those that define the 
progression along the pathway, and these were set 
to a chronology following the expert workshop. 
As already noted, the scenarios outlined are not 
forecasts, but illustrate plausible future energy 
system pathways and the interactions that are 
likely to shape their development.
Figure 5 summarises the key steps across the four 
scenarios. In the Minimum Smart scenario a lack of 
coordination and long-term vision coincides with 
weak consumer buy-in and results in the need to 
purchase carbon credits to meet environmental 
targets. The level and scope of smartness for this 
scenario are therefore low.
The Groundswell scenario, in contrast, sees strong 
consumer interest in and engagement with the 
energy system, resulting at least partially from 
increased national concern over the declining 
capacity margin and the upward trend in energy 
prices. This causes a radical paradigm shift at a 
community and local authority level, leading some 
areas to generate their own electricity and in some 
cases even manage their networks.
The Smart Power Sector scenario features highly 
resistant consumers. Smart grid developments 
therefore take place ‘behind the scenes’, although 
this means there are limits to what can be 
achieved. DNOs are, however, incentivised to do 
what they need to do in order to deal (much later 
on) with the emergence of EVs. There is a greater 
role for interconnection with Europe and grid-scale 
storage.
Smart 2050 sets the upper boundary for our 
scenarios. Well-coordinated and coherent policy 
action builds strong consumer engagement, 
resulting in a greater number of smart grid 
support services. Engagement differs here from 
the Groundswell scenario in that it is driven by 
policy and the availability of desirable options, 
leading to the emergence of a different set of 
technologies and changing the nature of the smart 
grid correspondingly.
The scenarios are discussed in detail in the next 
sections in decadal timespans across broad 
categories of Supply, Demand and Networks.
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3.1 Minimum Smart
Defining characteristics:
• A substantial amount of flexible generation 
results in a reduced need for smart 
technologies.
• Consumers remain mostly passive and not 
interested in adopting DSM.
• Network smartening only occurs as and when 
it is required or equipment is replaced.
• Substantial barriers remain, both to market 
reform and new market entrants.
• International permits and interconnectors are 
used to meet climate targets.
• Energy prices continue to rise.
Minimum Smart: Now – 2020
Supply Side
The UK’s fitful economic recovery means 
environmental objectives are low on the political 
agenda and the priority remains the restoration 
of growth. There is continued pressure on DECC 
from industry and the government to reduce 
financial support for green policies. The Treasury 
offers tax breaks to the shale gas industry and 
introduces policies that conflict with DECC’s 
long-term carbon reduction objectives. At the end 
of the decade a number of coal power stations 
shut due to the Large Combustion Plant Directive, 
most nuclear stations are reaching the end of 
their working lives, and the share of gas in the UK 
generation mix increases steadily, aided by the 
capacity mechanism. Although wind generation 
continues to grow there is little willingness to 
adopt more ambitious policy measures in this 
area. The strike prices established under the 
Contract for Difference for low carbon generation 
act as a price guarantee for the nuclear industry, 
with the government willing to amend this in line 
with perceived need. In the middle of the decade 
construction begins on new plants.
Demand Side
Smart meters are installed in homes and small 
businesses. Although capable of more, they are 
used only for the relaying of billing information. 
The accompanying in-home displays show energy 
consumption in financial terms but consumers 
are not engaging well, in part because trust in 
energy suppliers remains low. Consumer energy 
consumption patterns show no sign of changing 
and there appears to be little appetite for what bill 
payers regard as quite intrusive DSR technologies, 
such as devices that suggest alternative times 
to run appliances. Due to an installation process 
of varying quality, including problems in billing 
systems and an inadequate public information 
campaign, public support for the process is 
lukewarm. This slows down the rollout and the 
number of meters installed by 2020 is lower than 
originally anticipated. Energy prices continue to 
rise as political momentum towards a gas-centred 
system gathers pace, but public antipathy towards 
onshore renewables and other green policies 
remains sizeable.
Networks
Despite weak policy and regulatory guidance 
smart technologies are developing and being put 
to use. DNOs, motivated by cost savings, install 
smart monitoring equipment at medium voltage 
substations, as and when it is necessary, but in 
the absence of significant increases in demand 
levels DNO innovation remains low. The eight-
year timespan of RIIO-ED1 does little to drive 
innovation; DNOs are not motivated by the need 
for substantial innovation in the early part of the 
RIIO-ED1 period up to 2020 as they are uncertain 
of the extent to which enhanced smartness will be 
needed within the 2020-2023 period. Further, much 
of the requirement for connection to networks 
in the RIIO-ED1 period can be met with existing 
capacity – current system headroom is sufficient 
in many cases. In the absence of a clear pathway 
for carrying over the value of investment in 
innovation from ED1 to ED2, DNOs wait for RIIO-
ED2 to begin before enacting cost-saving measures 
so that they can receive the maximum financial 
benefit from doing so. DNOs continue to engage 
with the Low Carbon Networks Fund, then the 
Network Innovation Competitions and the Network 
Innovation Allowance. A basic communication 
infrastructure is put in place alongside the 
national smart meter rollout and the Data and 
Communications Company, Data Services Providers 
and Communications Service Providers begin to 
operate. However, the functionality of the system is 
limited to automated meter reading.
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As of 2013, National Grid have already been 
working with DECC and Ofgem towards a stated 
goal of devising possible additional safeguards 
to try to address some of the risks which might 
threaten system security in the near term. Two 
possible new balancing services have been 
suggested: Demand Side Balancing Reserve 
and Supplemental Balancing Reserve [20, 21]. 
The primary goal is to give National Grid more 
options in the case of narrowing capacity margins, 
particularly in 2013/14 and 2014/15. Demand 
Side Balancing Reserve is also intended to lay 
down regulations which will be conducive to the 
possible growth in demand side services within 
the developing context of the Electricity Market 
Reform.
Minimum Smart: 2020 – 2030
Supply Side
The UK fails to meet its 2020 renewable energy 
targets as the policy focus has been on securing 
supply through increased gas generation. The 
public stance towards onshore wind farms and 
other renewable technologies, such as large-
scale photovoltaics (PV), remains lukewarm as 
consumers associate rising electricity prices with 
environmental policies. Increases in offshore 
wind energy continue to prove tough to finance 
at the scale needed to hit the 2020 targets and 
the sources of capital needed prefer to look to 
onshore wind development and other renewable 
energy sources outside the UK. Offshore wind 
does continue to expand below the levels of the 
targets and by the mid-2020s the energy system 
incorporates around 15GW. Policy encouraging 
the construction and operation of gas-fired power 
stations over the previous decade and support for 
the exploration and exploitation of UK reserves 
spurs on the development of the shale industry. 
This offers a modest improvement to UK energy 
security, but does little to reduce consumer prices.
The implementation of the IED means that coal-
fired stations must either become cleaner still or 
cease to generate by the early 2020s. The rising 
carbon price floor reduces their competitiveness, 
and together these policies significantly reduce 
the total remaining coal capacity – much of it 
to be replaced by gas. Those coal stations still 
running often do so as part of the Capacity Market, 
receiving payment in return for availability. 
Opportunities for grid-scale storage remain limited. 
The majority of remaining nuclear capacity has 
shut down by 2023 despite debate over allowing 
continued operation with extended licences. 
Sizewell B remains the only operational plant from 
the earlier generation plants. The debate about 
new nuclear capacity is still running and no site 
for a high-level waste repository has been found. 
The plant commissioned in the mid-2010s is still 
being built owing to regulatory, legal and technical 
difficulties. The government increases the subsidy 
available in order to encourage investment in new 
nuclear build but this results in only one or two 
new agreements.
Demand Side
Smart metering in the residential sector results 
in small sustained savings in the region of only 
2-3%. However, more small and medium-sized 
enterprises are signing up to various services to 
help manage use and improve efficiency, with third 
party demand aggregators using half-hourly data 
to negotiate better deals for business customers. 
Large industrial users continue to provide near-
to-real-time data and this spreads slowly into 
the smaller-scale commercial sector. As prices 
rise, smaller industrial users see advantages 
in contracts that had previously only been 
relevant for large users, and some participate in 
the Capacity Market through aggregators. More 
sophisticated agreements between suppliers 
and consumers emerge and the ‘Big Six’ power 
companies, still dominant, compete to provide the 
most flexible contracts. There is therefore a small 
amount of DSR available in the system that can be 
called on at time of peak demand.
Networks
Communication networks gradually improve 
and expand to give better coverage. Although 
now smarter as a result, the lack of vision of 
policymakers and co-ordination from major 
industry players means that the power system is 
developing in a piecemeal fashion. As the industry 
remains fragmented, the split incentive problem 
persists, under which benefits do not accrue to 
those paying for them.
32
As a consequence of the Renewable Heat Incentive 
the number of ground- and air-source heat pump 
installations rises, predominantly in areas off the 
gas grid. Where clustering occurs, DNOs experience 
some localised difficulties at low voltage 
substations as locations off the gas grid correlate 
with the weaker parts of the distribution networks. 
Substations are simply upgraded by traditional 
means to handle the additional demand as the 
costs of smart solutions are still too high.
Minimum Smart: 2030 – 2040
Supply Side
Having reached 20GW of total wind capacity in 
the early 2030s, there is a need for some smart 
technology in certain areas to handle the more 
variable supply. Although R&D continues and 
improvements are being made, the relative costs 
of storage technologies are still considerably 
higher than those of gas-fired peaking plant. The 
generation mix consists of a small number of 
nuclear stations, many gas generators, and an 
assortment of renewables. These are deployed in 
an ad hoc fashion and consist mainly of wind but 
there are also some medium-scale solar PV farms, 
and a very small amount of newer technologies, 
such as tidal-stream devices. Modest amounts of 
microgeneration feed into the grid, but remain 
unproblematic for the DNOs.
Demand Side
In-home displays for smart meters remain a niche 
market but those available now have greater 
functionality. They are popular principally with 
customers with an active interest in their energy 
consumption or those who own an EV and are 
attempting to get the best value when charging it. 
The rate of heat pump installation has dropped as 
many of the properties that would benefit the most 
have had them installed.
Networks 
Early in the decade EVs are still relatively 
uncommon and tend to be found only in affluent 
urban areas, meaning DNOs rarely have to consider 
the impact they have on the local distribution 
network. More often than not, simply increasing 
the capacity of local transformers is sufficient 
to handle the increased power flows. Monitoring 
equipment is sometimes installed in areas that 
are likely to see rising numbers of EVs so that the 
networks are able to spot any congestion before it 
becomes problematic.
Minimum Smart: 2040 – 2050
Supply Side
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) for coal plants 
develops to the point where it can generate 
competitively, although this reduces the overall 
flexibility of the system and has an impact on 
consumer bills. The UK meets neither European 
nor domestic legislative renewables and emissions 
commitments. Investment in gas as a ‘bridging 
fuel’ has left a legacy of gas power stations that 
are expensive to close and the country therefore 
attempts to meet climate obligations through the 
purchase of carbon credits on the international 
market, which is increasingly expensive. A 
small amount of nuclear still contributes to the 
generation mix, although this is scheduled to cease 
operating in the decade following 2050.
Demand Side
Although the growth of electricity demand is offset 
to some extent by energy efficiency programmes, 
they have not been sufficiently successful to 
reverse the trend of rising demand over the 
decades. This increase has not been accompanied 
by a rise in demand side flexibility, and the familiar 
peaks in the demand profile are exacerbated by the 
rise in demand from the (albeit limited) adoption 
of heat pumps and EVs. The costs of constructing 
and operating a much greater amount of gas 
peaking plant, and making the necessary network 
upgrades, are borne by consumers.
Networks
The distribution network has patches of smartness 
that were developed to deal with demand 
fluctuations as necessary. EVs become more of a 
problem in some urban areas. Additional adoption 
of heat pumps also places further stresses on the 
system. Apart from this, the distribution networks 
look and function similarly to the last 20-30 
years. This means that R&D is limited, but those 
companies actively pursuing smart technologies 
are achieving more success in exporting technology 
and services.
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Minimum Smart: State of the World in 2050
 
In the Minimum Smart scenario the lack of drivers 
for system change means that the energy system 
has seen the least movement from the current 
profile (Figure 6). Power is generated in bulk at 
remote locations, transmitted nationally and then 
distributed to households and businesses through 
the distribution networks. The generation profile 
has altered slowly over four decades to 2050 – old 
nuclear power stations have been replaced with 
new ones and renewables make up a greater 
proportion of the overall mix. Gas generation has 
supplanted coal to a large degree. There have been 
substantial upgrades to parts of the distribution 
networks to accommodate increases in demand in 
places but operationally and organisationally the 
DNOs are very similar to how they were in 2014.
Most householders remain passive and do not 
take action to control and reduce their energy use 
and their engagement with the energy is limited 
to the size of their bill. Very few consumers adopt 
distributed generation technologies and the 
widespread conception of top-down, centralised 
generation perseveres. A lack of consumer trust 
in utilities and the absence of significant new 
entrants to the sector, combined with a lack of 
engagement, means there are insufficient drivers 
for significant uptake of demand side management 
(DSM).
Figure 6. Minimum Smart Scenario in 2050
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3.2 Groundswell 
Defining characteristics:
• Strong and growing interest in home energy 
efficiency and alternative energy technologies 
by consumers.
• Adoption of distributed generation through 
community projects, with some moving away 
from reliance on grid electricity.
• New market entrants in energy supply and 
aggregation, and growth of energy services 
companies.
• Few policy interventions, with policy largely 
playing catch-up with public attitudes.
Groundswell: Now – 2020
Supply Side
The amount of wind generation on the system 
grows from 10GW, but development is largely 
at offshore sites. The Large Combustion Plant 
Directive ensures the closure of a number of 
coal-fired stations by the middle of the decade 
with gas generation taking its place. The ongoing 
public debate about a new wave of nuclear plants 
hampers attempts to mitigate the shrinking of the 
capacity margin. Whilst participation in global 
gas markets helps security of supply, increasing 
dependence on imported gas exposes the UK 
to global price volatility as North Sea reserves 
continue to decline. As prices creep continually 
upwards mechanisms such as the Feed-in Tariff 
drive modest but steady growth in small-scale and 
domestic renewable generation. Signs of reduced 
reliability and the possibility of power outages also 
lead to growing interest in off-grid technologies. 
The ‘doom and gloom’ stories remain a favourite 
topic for the media, with evidence emerging that 
this is influencing public attitudes, encouraging 
energy saving and efficiency. 
Demand Side
The national smart meter and accompanying 
communications infrastructures are successfully 
rolled out by 2020 and the billing accuracy 
achieved by automated meter reading is readily 
welcomed by householders, resulting in increasing 
awareness of consumption levels and a growing 
interest in efficient appliances. Many householders 
use their in-home display regularly; some begin 
to take an interest in cost savings and a market 
for in-home displays with greater functionality 
emerges. Concurrently with the meter installations 
there is a slow but steady rise in the number 
of heat pumps, boosted by the Renewable Heat 
Incentive. They are mostly taken up in areas off 
the gas grid, gas remaining the most cost-effective 
method of space and water heating.
Networks
The modest rise in small-scale and community 
renewables means that DNOs start to consider the 
technical and cost implications of accommodating 
reverse power flows. A greater amount of 
investment is allowed under RIIO-ED1 such 
that DNOs begin to channel investment into 
innovative solutions rather than conventional 
fixes. However, as the growth of power-hungry 
technologies (such as EVs and heat pumps) is slow, 
advanced instrumentation is only being installed 
in the distribution networks on the basis of need 
and cost-effectiveness. Upgrades to increase the 
smartness of the network are restricted to areas 
with higher expected rises in peak demand and 
more complex load profiles – the latter often due to 
clusters of microgeneration typically occurring in 
rural areas.
Groundswell: 2020 - 2030
Supply Side
Wind capacity reaches 20GW in the mid-2020s 
when several large offshore installations are 
completed. The Renewable Heat Incentive 
stimulates supply chains, skills and business 
models, improving the economics of combined heat 
and power generation significantly. Additionally, 
the government grants local authorities greater 
control over energy issues, including power to 
ensure that benefits from renewables projects 
flow into nearby communities. A number of 
enterprising authorities start partnerships with 
businesses to operate combined heat and power 
units, often using local biomass or biogas. District 
heating develops in suitable areas including new-
build flats, tower blocks and warehouses with a 
high heat demand. Large-scale social landlords 
play an important role in driving energy-efficient 
new-build programmes, PV installation and whole-
block renewable heating systems. Energy storage 
regulations are clarified alongside RIIO-ED2 in 
the early-to-mid 2020s. As the decade continues, 
some storage devices are put in place for network 
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management, but only in situations where the high 
costs can be recouped and/or where it provides 
a vital balancing function in the transmission 
network. Growth in wind and PV across Europe 
drives greater levels of interconnection, providing 
an important source of supply side flexibility.
Demand Side
Householders’ understanding of their electricity 
consumption improves, and prompts greater 
interest in efficiency measures and heat pumps. 
Take-up of alternative tariff types grows, 
particularly among households possessing 
microgeneration and heat pumps. Residential 
aggregators emerge in such areas but in the 
absence of significant demand shifting they do 
not play a major role. Aggregators dealing with 
both the domestic sector and commercial sectors 
trade on the secondary market; with generators 
looking to hedge risk relating to non-appearance 
penalties. Residential DSR is developing but is in 
its infancy. Business consumers, particularly small 
and medium-sized enterprises, enthusiastically 
adopt advanced metering and sub-metering, 
flexible contracts, new tariff structures, and 
efficiency measures. Nationally, disaggregated data 
from smart meters is still not available to DNOs, 
but as those householders and businesses directly 
engaged with service providers start to see the 
benefits (with no reports of privacy breaches), trust 
in the use of data grows.
Local authority-run schemes that reinvest 
revenue from renewables projects in household 
efficiency measures are popular when well 
run. Clear communication of how they operate 
and transparent evidence that revenue is being 
reinvested effectively contributes to public 
acceptance of such ventures. The resulting 
awareness in energy and environmental issues 
helps to link the role of renewables in the 
generation profile, at both local and national 
levels, with personal energy use. The spread of 
these schemes is patchy and uncoordinated in 
both urban and rural areas. Some urban areas 
find the logistics too extensive to overcome; in 
others community groups have reached critical 
mass for efficiency and microgeneration projects 
to take hold successfully. Large concentrations of 
demand coupled with stronger and more effective 
governance capabilities result in economies of 
scale and greater returns to investment.
Networks
The clustering of heat pumps and microgeneration, 
and some of the local authority-led schemes cause 
localised network congestion. DNOs handle this 
by applying a range of smart technologies that 
enable aspects of active distribution network 
management. Some community schemes use 
small-scale storage technologies to balance their 
demand and generation profiles. Experience 
of being less reliant on grid electricity spreads 
and appeals to more communities. Some local 
authorities start to operate private wire networks, 
only using the grid for backup, but cost prevents 
this from becoming widespread.
Towards the end of the decade, regulatory reform 
allows the most advanced DNOs to take on more 
system management. They begin the transition 
to DSOs in those areas where smartness has 
clustered. Technologies enabling voltage profile 
management, remote switching and demand 
management are introduced to manage power 
flows on critical circuits as an alternative to 
increasing network capacity. DSOs and newer 
market entrants also provide some ancillary 
services to the Transmission System Operator 
(TSO), replacing services previously supplied by 
transmission-connected conventional generation. 
Work begins on the trialling of heat storage to 
reduce and manage loads on distribution networks.
Groundswell: 2030 - 2040
Supply Side
The growing collaboration between local 
authorities, network operators and businesses 
starts to disrupt the top-down supply-driven 
electricity system paradigm. The growth in 
community schemes and onset of demand 
management means that the installed capacity 
of wind reaches 30GW by the mid-2030s. This 
growth is split between onshore community-
owned turbines and large offshore installations. 
Investment in interconnection adds flexibility 
and supports a growing European super-grid. The 
growth in the number of households that own 
and/or operate microgeneration and small-scale 
storage technologies is significant, particularly PV 
in urban areas.
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There remains a substantial amount of gas in 
the UK generation mix, although the prospect of 
mandated use of carbon capture technologies 
causes investment uncertainty around the 
competitiveness of gas against renewables. The 
only nuclear-powered generators are the few that 
remain from the largely unsuccessful push for a 
new fleet that occurred in the 2010s.
Demand Side
The economics of EVs have been improving and 
they are now reasonably common in urban and 
suburban neighbourhoods. Whilst the grid requires 
reinforcement in places to handle the higher peak 
flows – particularly where clustering of vehicles 
occurs – networks are able to interact with the 
vehicles in order to smooth peaks. Innovative 
tariffs encourage consumers to accept some 
remote operation of vehicle charging. For example, 
network operators may contribute towards the 
upfront costs of the vehicles and guarantee the life 
of the batteries in return for some control over how 
they are charged.
The growth of EVs triggers greater demand side 
flexibility and the aggregators that emerged in the 
previous decade now play a greater role, offering a 
range of services from instant supplier switching to 
network management and system balancing.
As R&D has improved the performance of air-
source heat pumps, legislation is introduced to 
limit further growth of gas-fired heating systems 
in new housing developments. As business 
consumers see the benefits of time-of-use and 
flexible tariffs, some employees become interested 
in their domestic application.
Networks
As the 2030s progress, many rural areas source 
the majority of their electricity locally and rely 
less on the grid. DNOs regularly install sensors 
to improve network observability, and not just 
at the extremities of their networks.  Most DNOs 
have some control over distributed generators 
– including electrical and heat storage – and so 
continue to develop as DSOs.
This gradual – though partial – reallocation of 
control from the TSO to the DSOs is mirrored by 
a shift in investment: spending to increase the 
capacity of the transmission system has been 
lower than had been anticipated, although it 
still serves large non-domestic consumers and 
towns and cities, and carries bulk national and 
international flows.
Groundswell: 2040 – 2050
Supply Side
Centralised generation exists primarily to meet 
the needs of large towns, cities and industry: the 
bulk of which comes either from offshore wind 
or gas generators (some fitted with CCS). Strong 
integration with European networks adds flexibility, 
and smaller-scale generation from a wide range 
of technologies has grown and now makes up a 
significant proportion of supply capacity. Owners 
of large amounts of roof space commonly act as 
generators too, and commercial premises are able 
to provide demand side services by adjusting their 
heating and cooling needs, aided by a Capacity 
Market designed and operated in order to draw the 
maximum benefit from demand side measures 
before calling on generation.
Demand Side
Heat pumps and EVs often coincide in the same 
areas. Improvements in range and the national 
charging infrastructure mean EVs are popular 
across the country, with the batteries providing 
a valuable balancing function in areas with large 
amounts of renewables, which has been a major 
factor in the development of DNOs into DSOs. 
However, batteries have still not developed to 
the point where they can be used for dynamic 
storage at scale. The acceptance by consumers 
of time-of-use tariffs and the adoption of energy 
efficiency measures has helped to reduce peak 
demand, although significant demand shifting 
behaviour remains elusive. Although real-time 
price signals are available, residential consumers 
remain unconvinced of the benefits, and only a 
small number of business customers are taking up 
services based on dynamic pricing.
Networks 
The transmission system provides important 
flexibility at times when DSOs cannot provide 
sufficient DSR and also serves areas that cannot 
balance their own power needs. It also carries bulk 
power from areas rich in generation, especially 
renewable resources. The increased quantity 
of generation in the distribution networks has 
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reduced the load on the transmission system, 
and some of the skills and knowledge of active 
transmission network management acquired in 
previous decades have been transferred to the 
DSOs. 
Smartness in the distribution networks is patchy, 
causing some difficulty in urban areas where 
successful community or local authority schemes 
adjoin areas with less consumer engagement or 
where geography or property mix prevents the 
operation of cost-effective schemes. Some areas 
are keen to take even greater control by buying 
back their portions of the network, which presents 
complex regulatory and legal issues for Parliament 
and the regulator.
Groundswell: State of the World in 2050
 
This scenario describes a radical move away from 
the historical functioning of the power industry 
and a move towards a much more decentralised 
system in which ‘prosumers’ both contribute to 
and draw from the wider networks (Figure 7). A 
significant amount of electricity is generated at a 
household and community level, although large, 
centralised generation still has a role to play in 
meeting demand from urban centres and industry. 
A major driver for this kind of change has been 
consumer engagement, which has created demand 
for new energy services and pushed forward the 
evolution of the system. Network operators now 
play a much more active role in the management 
of their distribution systems.
Figure 7. Groundswell Scenario in 2050
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3.3 Smart Power Sector
Defining characteristics:
• Consumers are passive, and largely resistant to 
demand side measures.
• Strong policy-led development of renewable 
energy sources.
• Network operators take the lead with 
innovation as it is necessary to handle rises in 
demand from EV adoption.
• The supply industry deploys smart 
technologies and techniques where a 
business case can be made to avoid network 
reinforcement costs.
• Grid-scale energy storage and international 
connections form an important supply side 
solution.
Smart Power Sector: Now – 2020
Supply Side
Beyond the ongoing closures of large thermal plant 
(due to the Large Combustion Plant Directive) 
and remaining nuclear stations, there are no 
radical changes in the generation profile. Offshore 
wind generation grows in line with supply chain 
constraints and the availability of grid connections 
but well-organised campaigns prevent significant 
further onshore development. The government 
pushes ahead with plans to develop a new nuclear 
fleet to replace forthcoming closures, and a small 
number of new reactors are under construction by 
2020.
Demand Side
Although energy suppliers successfully install 
smart meters in all residential and small-to-
medium sized commercial properties by 2020, trust 
in the companies remains low as prices continue 
to rise. Optimism about the possible household 
savings soon wears off as negative stories about 
potential, suspected or actual privacy breaches 
emerge. The commercial sector is generally more 
accepting of the meters than the domestic sector. 
In addition to global gas markets, the policy 
support offered to conventional and renewable 
generation also inflates prices. Residential demand 
grows slowly with new sources of demand, such as 
EVs and heat pumps, remaining small in number 
and geographically dispersed. Small-scale PV 
installations have grown only very slowly as the 
Feed-in Tariff has been gradually reduced.
Networks
Emerging from successful Low Carbon Networks 
Fund and Network Innovation Competition 
projects, DNOs put in place selective monitoring 
and control equipment to assist with day-to-
day management and planning. However, this 
is only progressing at the rate of their asset 
replacement programmes. A basic communication 
infrastructure is developed alongside the 
national smart meter rollout. The Data and 
Communications Company and Data Services 
Providers start to operate, but they only pass 
historical aggregated data to the DNOs, which have 
limited usefulness for network management.
Smart Power Sector: 2020 – 2030
Supply Side
By the middle of the decade wind capacity reaches 
20GW, mostly due to ongoing policy support and 
accumulated offshore engineering expertise. Since 
the government gave communities a greater say 
in planning decisions, developers have largely 
abandoned trying to site onshore wind turbines. 
Further investment in renewables is encouraged 
by strong policy signals and government support – 
principally in the form of the EU Emissions Trading 
System, underpinned by the UK carbon price floor.
Gas generators still provide system flexibility, 
although wind generation capacity rises at a 
considerable rate and the TSO becomes concerned 
about managing periods of low demand and high 
generation; there is not always a ready export 
market or sufficient interconnector capacity. The 
fear is that prices may fall, adversely affecting 
investment in the industry. Regulatory reform 
resolves issues around DNOs owning and operating 
storage, and European targets for renewables, 
efficiency and emissions tighten. These provide 
impetus for R&D into system balancing and 
grid-scale storage technologies, paving the way 
for commercial development and new market 
entrants. Towards 2030 significant advances are 
made in energy storage technologies.
Demand Side
Residential consumers remain largely disengaged, 
and very little progress has been made regarding 
efficiency, load-shifting or demand reduction. As 
energy bills remain high, power companies remain 
a popular target for tabloid newspapers. The Green 
Deal, launched a decade earlier, has received 
such little interest that the government quietly 
drops the idea of a replacement scheme. As it is 
apparent that residential load shifting on a large 
scale is unfeasible, legislation mandating many 
types of white goods to be responsive to abnormal 
voltage and frequency is enacted. However, some 
efficiency improvements are made where energy 
management is the responsibility of the landlord 
rather than the tenant, especially with social 
housing providers and commercial users. 
Towards the end of the decade, EV numbers 
increase as sustained policy and private sector 
momentum results in a growing charging 
infrastructure. Businesses form partnerships with 
public and private organisations to provide services 
to EV owners and car clubs. Many towns and cities 
have numerous charging points, and the highest 
rates of EV growth are found in affluent suburban 
neighbourhoods. 
Networks
Surveys show consistently that consumers are 
unwilling to allow any further access to, or use 
of, the data that smart meters record. Although 
the aggregated historical data does help DNOs to 
plan investments and maintenance schedules, it 
does not assist real-time operation. The parts of 
the network with highest EV penetration almost 
require active management and the lack of 
observability has become an issue. If the present 
rate of EV growth continues, the business case for 
widespread monitoring equipment at low voltage 
substations will soon become realistic. As it seems 
that the existing smart meter infrastructure will 
be unavailable to them, DNOs start to consider 
the value of creating dedicated metering and 
communications systems.
Smart Power Sector: 2030 – 2040
Supply Side
By the early 2030s, a number of new nuclear power 
stations contribute around 10% of the generation 
capacity. This helps to accommodate the growing 
use of EVs, improving diversity of supply, and 
moves the UK towards emissions reduction targets. 
By the mid-2030s there is around 30GW of wind 
capacity, although this is increasingly difficult to 
integrate due to the near-total absence of DSR. The 
construction of a multinational North Sea HVDC 
grid is expected to alleviate this to some extent.
Towards the end of the decade, power stations 
built during the second ‘dash for gas’ begin to face 
closure; those with lifetime extensions continue 
to operate but are subject to increasingly stringent 
environmental regulation. The flexibility provided 
by gas generation becomes increasingly valuable 
to the system, and many are granted extensions 
on this basis. Investment in R&D a decade ago 
has produced a small but growing number of 
grid-scale storage devices, a development that 
assures the investment community that the risks 
of constraining the growth of renewables can be 
mitigated.
Demand Side
The number of EVs rises quickly as higher sales 
in other countries brings down the relative price 
of the vehicles. This increases the size of evening 
peaks, which prove difficult to shift due to the very 
low levels of consumer engagement. Although 
vehicles are fitted with software that can take 
account of the network’s frequency and voltage 
conditions, or even communicate automatically 
with the network operator, most owners over-ride 
these features.
There is only a limited response to time-of-use 
pricing, as the incentives remain insufficient to 
change consumer behaviour. Lengthy studies 
reveal that consumer inertia and the ‘hassle 
factor’ are greater barriers to tariff switching and 
home improvements than previously thought. It 
becomes evident that only house-by-house, street-
by-street refurbishment programmes such as those 
carried out in some low-population Scandinavian 
countries are successful at significantly reducing 
domestic energy consumption.
Networks
Increasingly sophisticated demand modelling, 
using better quality historical power use 
data, assists with network planning and asset 
management. ICT and high performance 
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computing tools advance the point at which DNOs 
use near-to-real-time distribution system state 
estimation as a regular network management tool. 
The strong emergence of EVs creates significant 
challenges for DNOs, which in some cases are 
addressed by simply upgrading low voltage 
network capacity. In other areas, including some 
new-build housing estates, there is a business 
case for putting in place smart technologies 
from the outset. Other interventions by DNOs 
include improved monitoring and switching for 
network reconfiguration and increased types and 
levels of automation as networks edge towards 
active management. The improved network 
visibility assists with condition monitoring, asset 
management and planning.
Smart Power Sector: 2040 – 2050
Supply Side
The generation mix in the 2040s is characterised 
by a high level of renewables – predominantly 
large-scale offshore wind developments. Nuclear 
provides baseload generation, and by 2050 all of 
the country’s unabated gas-fired power stations 
cease operation in order for the country’s 
emissions targets to be met. With a rigid demand 
side there is a heavy reliance on storage and 
interconnection to provide supply side flexibility. 
A strongly integrated European electricity market 
and European super-grid bolster supply security 
across Europe, so less emphasis is placed on 
national security of supply.
Demand Side
Suppliers are considering the merits of the next 
generation of smart meters. However, given 
ongoing concerns about data privacy and public 
attitudes towards power companies, there is 
virtually no prospect of upgrading the original 
rollout. Various attempts have been made to 
encourage the use of smarter meters, but with 
little success. There are now a large number of 
EVs on the roads and a well-developed charging 
infrastructure along motorways, which increases 
baseload demand substantially. With little 
demand side flexibility, the government considers 
legislation to allow more effective management of 
this greatly increased demand.
Figure 8. Smart Power Sector Scenario in 2050
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Networks
Active network management is normal at all 
voltage levels and spans of the transmission and 
distribution systems, and there is particular focus 
on parts of the low voltage networks, typically 
where EV clusters appear. Dealing with the rising 
demand from passive consumers over the last 40 
years has forced the industry to create a largely 
smart grid, but with significant patches where 
simple reinforcement was the easiest and cheapest 
solution.
The HVDC transmission system connecting 
regional renewable resources such as North Sea 
offshore wind, Spanish solar and Norwegian hydro 
to large centres of demand is operating and is 
expected to expand.
Smart Power Sector: State of the World in 2050
 
Under this scenario government commitment to 
emissions targets leads to significant growth in 
variable output generation (Figure 8). Consumer 
antipathy prevents major smart developments at 
household and community levels, including DSR 
and very advanced metering and tariffs. However, 
the growing power demand resulting from the 
steady adoption of EVs combined with the amount 
of variable generation results in system balancing 
problems. The value of grid-scale storage becomes 
significant at this point, as the system can be 
managed much more effectively if it is developed 
and applied at scale. In the absence of storage, 
however, the difficulty of managing the system 
leads to a branching point: either consumers are 
offered extremely generous incentives in return 
for demand side flexibility or very expensive 
network upgrades are made to accommodate 
the much higher power flows. The roles and 
responsibilities of the DNOs, such as the level of 
active management, depend upon which branch 
is followed. As in the Minimum Smart scenario 
domestic consumers are unwilling to become 
active service providers, and there is little in the 
way of innovation encouraging them to alter their 
stance. Again there are insufficient drivers for 
significant uptake of DSM.
3.4 Smart 2050
Defining characteristics:
• Strong and sustained policy commitment to 
renewable energy.
• Capital is available at competitive rates
• Consumers are active and willing to engage 
with energy issues.
• Policy and regulation is supportive of 
low carbon technologies and associated 
infrastructure.
• DNOs invest in and develop widespread 
active network management techniques and 
technologies.
Smart 2050: Now – 2020
Supply Side
The contribution of coal to the generation profile 
declines in line with the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive and (later) the European Industrial 
Emissions Directive. The amount of nuclear 
generation also falls as ageing plants close. 
Increasing gas- and biomass-fired generation 
fills the gap left by closing coal plant, and 
although replacement programmes for one or 
two nuclear plants are starting, the long-term 
economic viability of nuclear remains unclear. 
Interconnection capacity increases, taking 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities arising from 
the significant and growing wind and PV capacity 
across Europe.
Towards the end of this decade there is further 
and substantial market reform, as international 
developments – especially global climate 
agreements – lead the UK to reinforce its 
commitment to meeting its 2050 legislation. This 
leads to stronger policy measures in a range of 
areas including CCS and energy storage.
Demand Side
Smart meters are successfully installed with a 
strong and credible public information campaign 
despite some media scare stories. A dedicated 
intermediary Data and Communications Company 
is set up smoothly and the new company manages 
the flows of data effectively and securely. Various 
smart phone apps start to appear with particularly 
well-designed ones attracting significant numbers 
of users.
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This results in an underestimation of the impact 
of meters and in-home displays. The benefits 
of installing the meters become tangible to 
consumers as they begin to understand how their 
energy use fluctuates throughout the day and 
across the seasons. As the use of in-home displays 
is coupled with phone apps, many consumers 
focus on the potential for cost savings rather than 
the privacy risks.
Some larger city-based EV trials (UK and abroad) 
begin to allay range anxiety and have a marked 
positive impact on the general perception of 
the vehicles. This spurs new investment in R&D 
to improve battery performance, and there is 
optimism that this will allow economies of scale to 
take hold, improving EVs’ competitiveness against 
conventional vehicles. Although the government 
continues to offer subsidies for the cars, in the 
absence of a national strategy for infrastructure 
development the new cars are small in number 
and confined mostly to urban areas.
Networks
A clear long-term vision from Ofgem encourages 
TSOs and DNOs to innovate and allows 
consideration of long-term investment that 
extends into the RIIO-T2 and RIIO-ED2 periods. The 
Network Innovation Competition proves effective 
at incentivising innovation in the transmission 
networks. Through RIIO, regulation begins to be 
effective in encouraging DNOs to innovate and 
adopt alternatives to traditional investment where 
financially viable.  This helps to increase the 
capacity of existing network assets and to reduce 
the investment burden.
Smart 2050: 2020 – 2030
Supply Side
Despite missing the 2020 EU renewables targets, 
growth in both onshore and offshore wind means 
that they are reached not long into the decade.
Clear and effective policy and improved grid-access 
arrangements cause the proportion of variable 
supply to rise to 30GW by the middle of the 
decade. Much of this growth is in offshore wind, 
but biomass makes a significant contribution and 
early tidal stream schemes start to operate. Despite 
various technical and financial difficulties, a small 
number of new nuclear plants start to generate 
towards the end of the decade.
Innovation in interruptible contracts allows 
smaller consumers with non-essential shiftable 
power demand – such as industrial refrigeration, 
heat storage and some types of machinery – to 
offer demand side services. Whilst this provides 
a small amount of demand side flexibility, the 
much more substantial benefits from DSM in 
the residential sector are yet to be exploited. A 
substantial round of market reform passes in 
the late 2020s designed to boost competition and 
stimulate the provision of new and conventional 
services. Legislation passes that guarantees storage 
reliable access to market (within the constraints 
of network balancing), controls how and by 
what means networks and aggregators are able 
to exercise demand side control measures over 
appliances in customers’ homes, and redefines the 
roles and responsibilities of DNOs, allowing them 
to own and/or operate generation and storage.
Demand Side
Greater pricing and costing transparency, growing 
energy awareness, and a long-term trend of 
rising energy bills leads householders to take 
a more active interest in reducing their energy 
consumption. This level of interest grows slowly 
through the first half of the 2020s led by younger 
more tech-aware urbanites whose salaries are 
stretched by housing costs. This results in modest 
but sustained behavioural changes, and a desire 
for a wider variety of tariffs to suit their needs. 
The real-time pricing information now available 
makes customer communication and pricing much 
simpler and somewhat improves the perception of 
power companies in the mind of the public.
Throughout the 2020s and beyond, the capabilities 
of in-home displays improve. As consumer 
interest grows, a market for devices with greater 
functionality than the basic ones issued at 
rollout develops. These in-home displays are 
able to interact with household appliances and 
manufacturers of white goods increasingly supply 
inter-operable products. A burgeoning aggregation 
industry maximises the value of DSR for 
commercial customers for both energy balancing 
and network management purposes.
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Networks
Ongoing installation of monitoring equipment 
at substations means that DNOs develop better 
observability within their networks and are able 
to focus investment on those parts under greatest 
stress. This is a direct result of the regulatory 
changes made as part of RIIO-ED1, which 
enables DNOs to justify ‘forward investment’ in 
enabling technologies that help avoid expensive 
conventional capital expenditure on network 
reinforcement. Successful trial schemes to embed 
intelligence and automation in the networks 
are extended as experience spreads enabling 
DNOs to begin actively managing some areas 
where EV penetration is growing. This is aided 
by clarification from the regulator regarding the 
roles and responsibilities of both the TSO and 
DNOs. Consideration is given to potential conflicts 
that may arise from DNOs managing their own 
networks and the TSO managing the national 
system.
The rising price of heating fuels (in combination 
with the Renewable Heat Incentive) triggers many 
consumers off the gas grid to install ground- and 
air-source heat pumps to meet their heating needs. 
By the mid-to-late 2020s this leads to congestion 
on some local distribution networks as systems 
are frequently clustered in areas and installed at 
similar times.
Smart 2050: 2030 – 2040
Supply Side
By the start of the 2030s sustained policy support 
has led to the construction of several coal-fired 
power stations fitted with CCS. The small number 
of nuclear stations also contributes to meeting 
baseload demand. Even though the TSO and DNOs 
are gaining experience and confidence operating 
with less baseload power, gas-fired generation 
is still used at times of peak demand. However, 
legislation requiring that gas be fitted with CCS, 
and the consequent loss of flexibility, is adding 
impetus to the efforts to scale up the role of 
electrical storage.
Throughout the 2030s renewables and 
interconnection capacity grow, with connections 
to Ireland and Norway providing the UK with an 
important flexible resource that helps counter the 
less-predictable output from the large amount 
of offshore wind now contributing to the system. 
Construction of a European super-grid offers 
further potential for the accommodation of 
renewables in the UK system.
Demand Side
By the early 2030s, the majority of households have 
one of a range of more advanced in-home displays. 
Whilst the complexity of these varies, most are 
able to handle much more rapid forms of two-way 
communication with the customer via mobile 
phone apps. Growing participation in aggregation 
services results in lower household energy prices. A 
modest proportion of householders take advantage 
of dynamic and critical peak pricing tariffs, and 
new market entrants provide a range of energy 
services to consumers (as well as to network 
operators). These include the provision of heating 
and lighting by energy service companies rather 
than conventional per-unit energy sales. New 
entrants are able to team up with aggregators and 
network operators in order to offer consumers new 
ways of managing their energy use, allowing them 
greater control and opening up further potential 
for DSR.
The introduction of EU-wide EV charging 
infrastructure legislation a decade earlier has 
stimulated the number of EVs on the roads and 
changed the economics relative to conventional 
vehicles. This results in greater power demand 
in some areas, which causes stress on parts of 
the distribution network, particularly where heat 
pumps – increasingly competitive with gas-fired 
central heating – become more common. This 
stimulates the development of DSM devices and 
tariffs to ensure that EVs do not draw charge 
during peak hours. Later in the decade, trials show 
that EV users can benefit from quasi-dynamic 
tariffs.
Networks
Monitoring and automation equipment is now 
widespread across the MV network, with patches 
of smart technologies in selected substations 
in the low voltage networks. To improve active 
management in these networks, DNOs look to 
introduce some control over the demand profile 
to reduce congestion where EVs are clustering. 
Through collaboration with aggregators, by the 
mid-2030s they are able to shift some residential 
load at times of peak demand.
44
Under conditions specifically defined to ensure 
stable network operation, DNOs are allowed access 
to short periods of detailed near-to-real-time 
data. This remains patchy as the smart meter 
communications networks are still developing 
beyond the basic original installation.
Smart 2050: 2040 – 2050
Supply Side
The power generation system is now able to 
rely on a wider range of sources: offshore and 
onshore wind, gas, nuclear, tidal stream, PV, 
some biomass and small amounts of wave power. 
Grid-scale storage plays an important balancing 
role with several technologies with different 
operational characteristics. Gas-fired stations still 
play a significant role, although their flexibility 
is constrained by CCS technologies. The global 
development of demand side technologies and 
techniques, in tandem with high fossil fuel prices, 
means that DSM is often more cost-effective 
than peaking plant. The nuclear stations built in 
the 2020s provide baseload generation although 
pressure to start planning for their replacements 
begins to build.
Demand Side
People who grew up with in-home displays 
controllable via phone apps are energy literate 
and start families of their own. For a significant 
and growing proportion of the population, energy 
conservation is a normal activity and an important 
consideration when buying a house. Low efficiency 
homes with higher levels of energy consumption 
are unpopular and clearly discounted in the 
housing market because of the costs of heating 
and/or insulating them to a decent standard.
EVs are prevalent and the tendency for them to 
cluster means owners are required to take part in 
DSM as part of the ownership package. For some 
DNOs this includes the use of specially-designed 
time-of-use tariffs and critical peak pricing.
Networks
Although construction of a European transmission 
network and a North Sea offshore grid are not yet 
finished, the parts completed add a robustness that 
TSOs and DNOs can exploit at a subnational level. 
Cost-competitive storage technologies assist with 
the active management of networks where EVs, 
heat pumps and PV are commonplace.
Homes, particularly those that have electric 
heating or own an EV, can interact with the local 
network via their phone or computer in order to 
choose how and when the DNO or a third party 
can enact demand side measures. Consumers are 
accustomed to communicating with the network 
operator as well as their supplier – indeed, in some 
cases these two roles have merged, with single 
companies providing both services. Despite the 
well-developed demand control abilities of network 
operators there has been an ongoing need to make 
very significant network upgrades in areas where 
demand has risen.
Smart 2050: State of the World in 2050
 
This scenario can be seen as one in which many 
drivers come together to lead to a future in 
which 2050 emissions and renewables targets are 
met through a combination of top-down policy 
interventions and public willingness to engage 
(Figure 9). There is a general consensus around 
the need for action to tackle climate change 
and an acceptance that it will be funded largely 
through energy bills. Consumer engagement makes 
possible demand side measures that allow large 
amounts of renewables to be accommodated 
into the generation profile, although there is still 
a large role for baseload generation. Network 
operators play a much more active role in system 
balancing and whilst it was initially possible to 
delay significant network reinforcement with the 
application of smart technologies, ultimately the 
ongoing electrification of heat and transport has 
meant that substantial conventional investment 
has been necessary.
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3.5 Comparison of scenarios
Table 3 provides a brief overview of the differences 
in the main characteristics of each of four 
scenarios. The number of bullets conveys the 
comparative extent to which notable possible 
characteristics of the UK’s future energy system 
are apparent in each scenario. A brief glance will 
show, for example, that the role of residential 
consumers in the Smart Power Sector scenario is 
minimal compared to its role in the Groundswell 
scenario. The list of characteristics is not 
exhaustive.
3.6 Switching between pathways
One of the benefits of the FAR methodology is the 
possibility for switching between the different 
scenarios, which can be seen in Figure 5. As the 
pathways begin to take shape as part of the FAR 
process, it becomes clear that there are points 
at which the routes can diverge, converge or 
‘jump’ from one to another. Merging points are 
less common than branching points and tend to 
occur less far into the future, thus demonstrating 
alternative routes towards a given endpoint, 
whereas branching points can be seen as points 
in time where critical events occur that will shape 
the future (often, but not always, through an active 
decision-making process).
In addition to merging and branching, there are 
points at which a given pathway can ‘switch’ from 
one to another. The Faustian Tree developed as part 
of the FAR process presents a number of points 
where it is possible to switch between pathways. 
Clearly, looking at the diagram, there are a number 
of places where the pathways overlap. We focus on 
and expand two of these below.
Switching away from smart power sector
Smart Power Sector progresses to a point where it 
is essentially forced to switch into another scenario 
due to active resistance from the public in the 
form of a refusal to participate in any demand 
side measures whatsoever. The way in which such 
an obstacle is tackled constitutes the branching 
point; in this case, how demand side inflexibility is 
addressed dictates whether the scenario switches 
Figure 9. Smart 2050 Scenario in 2050
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Table 3. Comparison of scenarios*
Function Minimum Smart Groundswell
Smart Power 
Sector Smart 2050
UK policy commitment • • • • • • • • • • • • •
EU policy strength • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Supply
Large-scale renewables • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Decentralised renewables • • • • • • • • • •
Nuclear • • • • • • • • • • • •
Unabated gas • • • • • • • • •
Carbon capture and storage • • • • • • • • •
Grid-scale storage • • • • • • • • • • •
Interconnection • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Demand
Tariff complexity • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Advanced smart metering • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Electrification of heat • • • • • • • • • • • 
Electrification of transport • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Industrial and commercial DSR • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Residential DSR • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Networks
Advanced monitoring and controls • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
DNO’s consumer data access • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Active network management • • • • • • • • • • • • •
DNO’s own and/or operate 
generation
• • • • • • • • • • • • •
Smart Grid Services Enabled
Balance a large amount of 
renewables
ü ü ü
Greater observability and 
controllability of the grid
ü ü ü ü
Enable deployment of DSR 
technologies
ü ü
Active network management ü
Integration of active loads (heat 
pumps & EV’s)
ü ü ü
Allow integration of energy 
storage
ü ü
* The number of bullets conveys the comparative extent to which possible characteristics of the UK’s future energy 
system are apparent in each scenario.
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to Minimum Smart or Smart 2050 (see below, The 
Consequences of Switching Pathways). If economic 
signals are increased to such an extent that DSR 
is initiated (or it is perhaps mandated), then 
this improves demand side flexibility and allows 
further renewables development (potentially at 
high cost). Such an approach may be economically 
and/or politically undesirable and supply side 
flexibility may be the preferred option, owing either 
to cost or political expediency. In this instance the 
pathway would switch to Minimum Smart, and a 
system characterised, presumably, by a relatively 
larger proportion of gas generation.
Branching point: policy decisions
Box G in the Faustian Tree represents a point 
in future where the effects of the smart meter 
rollout on consumer engagement are being felt, 
and where a significant policy decision concerning 
generation is taken. Such a decision is very likely to 
be influenced by a wide array of factors, including 
international climate negotiations and global 
energy markets. A strong policy decision in favour 
of renewable generation sends the scenario down 
a very different pathway – one requiring a much 
higher level of consumer engagement – than a 
policy decision that favours gas, which may be 
a consequence of global shale exploitation and 
falling gas prices, for example. This branching 
point is the first point at which the Smart 2050 and 
Smart Power Sector scenarios diverge.
The consequences of switching pathways
Switching between pathways should be interpreted 
as moving from one scenario to another that is 
broadly similar to the destination scenario and not 
necessarily identical. It is also important to note 
that switching from one pathway to another may 
well involve going effectively ‘back in time’, similar 
in nature as the decision-making and investment 
times involved would mean the destination 
pathway would be less developed than if it had 
been followed from the beginning. Switching can 
therefore be costly in terms of time and resources 
and is likely to have a significant impact on all 
factors – consumers, markets, networks, generation 
etc. Whilst in most cases it will be a setback, it 
can also be seen as an opportunity to move from 
a pathway where environmental objectives are 
unlikely to be met to one in which they are within 
reach, although more expensively and later than 
might otherwise have been the case.
3.7 Wildcards
We have located ‘wildcards’ throughout the 
scenarios. These are events that would represent 
a shock of some kind to the energy system 
and would necessitate some form of response. 
Although several of these wildcards could fit into 
any scenario, we have generally located them 
where they are either most likely to occur or have 
the most intuitive ‘fit’, or where their occurrence 
would be likely to have the most significant impact 
– perhaps leading to a switch from one scenario to 
another (Table 4).
For example in the case of the Major Nuclear 
Incident wildcard, a rapid phase-out of nuclear 
generation under the Smart Power Sector scenario 
might result in either a sudden ‘switching on’ of 
consumer engagement as the public is prepared to 
accept voluntary or enforced behavioural change 
(which is not without precedent – e.g. as seen in 
Japan following the nuclear incidents in 2011), or 
the complete absence of such public willingness 
may lead to the hurried construction of a large 
amount of gas generation. In this situation, 
therefore, the pathway may switch either to the 
Smart 2050 or to the Minimum Smart scenario 
respectively. We highlight that such events 
often result in change that represents a radical 
departure from the status quo – something which 
many scenarios projects do not attempt to address 
but are nevertheless important to consider.
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Table 4. The effect of wildcards on scenarios
Re-nationalisation: Smart Power Sector
Public anger towards power companies reaches such a pitch that the industry is renationalised wholesale 
and paid for in part through general taxation. Costs go up as inefficiencies creep in but there is a much 
greater level of support for decarbonisation.
Break-up of utilities: Minimum Smart
Legislation limits the size of power companies, which then find it difficult to secure funding for large 
renewable projects. Finance is more accessible for thermal plant, so decarbonisation falters. Consumer 
prices fall, however.
Nuclear fusion breakthrough: Minimum Smart
With less need for DSM, the current peaks in demand are amplified by the adoption of electric heating 
and transportation. Very significant upgrading of low voltage networks is required in order to handle this 
growth in demand.
Getting rid of charging codes: Smart 2050 and Smart Power Sector
Action is taken to modify the charging methodologies and associated codes as they apply to DNOs, such 
that charges for load and generation (including storage) connected to the network are amended and that 
changes outside specified limits in either category have to be communicated to the DNO. This allows 
DNOs to have greater knowledge of installations across their networks and helps to reduce, for example, 
the impact of clustering of EVs and heat pumps. This could apply more strictly to the industrial and 
commercial sectors as desired and as appropriate to the scenario.
Cyber-security disaster: All Scenarios
The hacking of smart meters on a large scale demonstrates the inherent vulnerabilities of the system. 
Customers become very reluctant to share any data beyond a basic meter reading on a monthly basis, 
making it much more difficult for DNOs to plan future investments. Conventional reinforcements favoured 
over smart technologies.
Reports of smart meters catching fire (for example): Smart 2050
Negative press coverage of the dangers of smart meters, even though there is little evidence of this, leads 
to widespread public resistance, making much needed DSM much more difficult to implement.
Another major nuclear accident: Smart Power Sector
A major nuclear incident results in huge loss of public confidence and a political decision to phase out 
nuclear generation rapidly, resulting in a shift to renewables. The public is much more accepting of the 
necessary demand side measures and distributed renewables receive a major boost. Networks are required 
to act rapidly to accommodate the change in supply profile. Shift to Smart 2050.
Alternatively, consumer intransigence results in a shift to gas generation as it becomes clear than demand 
side measures will be impossible to implement. Shift to Minimum Smart.
Growth of energy co-operatives (similar to Germany): Smart 2050
The emergence of the type of energy co-operative seen in Germany, in which communities retain (majority) 
ownership, reduces the dominance of large industry players. DNOs need to respond to the rapidly growing 
amount of distributed generation in the networks. Shift to Groundswell.
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Table 4 cont. The effect of wildcards on scenarios
Emergence of a European regulator: Smart 2050
Increasing energy market integration, regulatory co-operation between member states, and pressure 
to minimise the cost to the consumer of large-scale renewables leads to the emergence of a body of EU 
regulation and ultimately to an EU-level regulator. This body takes on increased responsibility over time, 
with Ofgem moving from the responsible body to a facilitating body.
The move is driven by the European Commission to secure reduced costs in meeting EU-wide renewable 
energy targets via closer integration. There are various possible actions, representing different levels of 
integration. These include integrated forecasting of renewable energy and more strategic interconnection 
and infrastructure planning. It might also act as a driver for integrated innovation projects relating to 
smarter energy delivery.
Scottish Independence: All Scenarios
The impacts of Scottish independence are unknown to a significant degree. Independence would leave 
Scotland with more generation capacity than it requires as well as a large fraction of wind, wave and tidal 
energy potential.
The nations may develop divergent regulatory frameworks but there is a significant chance that a single 
market might be maintained across the current GB territory. Some Scottish political actors have expressed 
a desire for this but this may not be advantageous to all parties. Scottish generators would have little 
option other than to sell via the England interconnectors which may have impacts on price. 
Both Scotland and the reduced UK may have to renegotiate renewable energy targets with the EU and this 
might be complicated by the EU’s position on Scotland becoming an independent member state. Given the 
reduced UK’s lessened potential for renewable generation it may no longer need to import as much from 
Scotland as is currently the case. This might have implications for how much smart technology is needed 
to facilitate intermittent generation and where the costs of facilitation would be met.
Climate Impacts: Groundswell and Smart 2050
As summers become hotter reverse-cycle heat pumps become a more attractive investment for many 
residential and commercial premises. While this drives up demand over the summer (and reduces network 
capacity) it also increases the potential for DSM.
Social and Spatial 
Implications
4
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This chapter introduces the findings from a 
number of public workshops, and examines the 
social and spatial implications of our scenarios.
4.1 Public acceptability
Participants in the four public workshops 
reflected a range of geographic, demographic 
and educational backgrounds, as well as home 
types and smart grid-relevant experience. This 
section summarises the main findings from (a) 
the questionnaires and (b) the qualitative analysis 
of the workshop discussions, on smart grid 
experience, knowledge and attitudes and responses 
to the draft scenarios.
Prior experience and knowledge of smart grids
In respect of relevant experience, around half (53%) 
owned timed appliances, most commonly central 
heating or washing machines, although only 11% 
were on an Economy-7 electricity tariff. Most said 
they were very (26%) or quite (57%) satisfied with 
the way they receive their electricity bills, but 
knowledge of the electricity system and of smart 
grids was relatively low, (see Figure 10) – although 
higher for rural (mean 2.6) than urban respondents 
(1.8). Nevertheless, there was interest in all smart 
grid-related topics, notably saving energy (Table 5).
Informed opinion about smart grids
Following the workshop, participants’ informed 
opinions on smart grids were elicited through 
questionnaires. Attitudes can be characterised 
as ambivalent (Figure 11); that is, smart grids are 
thought to afford both benefits and risks. It is 
noteworthy that the balance of benefits to risks is 
greatest for power companies, whilst somewhat 
higher risks are believed to befall consumers.
Questionnaires also asked about the nature of the 
risks and benefits perceived for consumers, private 
companies, and society in relation to smart grids. 
The most common types of consumer benefit cited 
were lower energy bills and lowering energy use 
generally. Benefits cited for private companies were 
more varied but also included financial benefits, 
improved efficiency and system performance. In 
terms of societal benefits, environmental benefits 
(e.g. reduced emissions) were most commonly 
cited, followed by improved public awareness, 
reduced bills and fewer blackouts.
Figure 10. Self-reported knowledge of electricity system and smart grids across participant 
groups (pre-workshop)
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Consumer risks cited were dominated by privacy 
concerns, though costs, reliability and control 
issues were also mentioned. Respondents were 
less certain about risks to power companies or 
societal risks. Of those mentioned for companies, 
financial risks were most prevalent while excessive 
control by power companies was cited by several 
participants, with respect to broader societal risks.
Responses to scenarios
In order to engage workshop participants with the 
four scenarios, narrative storylines illustrating 
an individual’s day-to-day life in the case of 
each scenario were created and presented to 
participantsvi. Workshop participants tended to 
view the Minimum Smart scenario as bleak, partly 
because it involved people having to monitor their 
energy use very closely, and partly because it was 
anticipated that technology would have developed 
far more by 2050.
However, it was viewed as realistic in the sense 
that energy bills were continuing to rise:
‘Well it’s just like they’re not really enjoying 
life. They’re constantly concerned about 
cutting their energy bills down; fair enough 
but they’re not really enjoying their life at 
home.’ (R4, Rural A)
The idea of having to pay more attention to 
energy use was perceived as an extra pressure 
in already difficult and time-pressed lives. 
Despite this resistance to monitoring, smart 
meters tended to be viewed more positively, as 
a way to help consumers save money and cut 
consumption. Some did question why they were 
being introduced, as it was perceived that helping 
to reduce customer bills was not in the interest 
of power companies. In addition, it was assumed 
that smart meters would need to consume 
energy themselves in order to function. There 
was also speculation that smart metering would 
lead to family members obsessively monitoring 
consumption, causing tension in households. 
Overall, consumers would need to be convinced of 
a clear benefit in order to guarantee widespread 
adoption of smart meters.
Participants were also asked whether they would 
like household appliances displaying energy usage. 
Answers here varied considerably. It was thought 
that having displays would increase awareness 
of usage and may be useful for larger appliances 
such as washing machines. Displays were likened 
to having energy efficiency stickers on new 
appliances. There was some resistance to replacing 
old but reliable appliances, with the underlying 
assumption that older appliances were better 
quality.
Table 5. Interest in smart grid related topics (pre-workshop)
Mean* SD
Receiving lower energy bills 4.6 0.7
Lowering my energy use 4.5 0.9
Owning more energy efficient appliances 4.4 0.7
Lowering our emissions 4.3 0.7
Being able to monitor energy use at room/appliance level 4.3 0.9
Using new technologies to reduce fuel dependency 4.2 0.9
Becoming less reliant on fossil fuels 4.1 0.9
Sourcing more energy from renewable resources 4.1 1.3
Producing energy at community level 3.9 1.1
Producing my own energy 3.8 0.9
* 5-point scale: 1 = Not at all Interested; 5 = Extremely Interested
vi Note that draft, rather than final, scenarios were presented at the public workshops and that revisions to the scenarios 
were made following a project advisory group meeting. In particular, an earlier scenario referred to as ‘Partially Smart’ 
was modified to ’Groundswell’ by highlighting and expanding the scope of community energy schemes as the key 
scenario driver. As these schemes were already included in the draft version, the results remain applicable. The revisions 
in the other scenarios are minimal.
Society
Private companies
Consumers
Risks
Benefits
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It was often assumed that ‘smart’ appliances 
would be more expensive, presenting a very 
practical barrier to ownership:
‘That’s the problem, I worry about the smart 
appliances being out of my reach, my financial 
reach, or I’ll end up getting them on hire 
purchase and paying right through the nose’ 
(R1, Urban A)
The scenario Smart Power Sector was viewed as a 
more positive version of the future when compared 
with the Minimum Smart scenario. It was seen 
as more developed and futuristic, and for this 
reason a more likely portrayal of how 2050 might 
be. However, debate concerning the collection of 
personal data and how it might be used dominated 
discussion.
Participants questioned how consumers would 
benefit from allowing personal data to be collected, 
whereas it was automatically assumed that power 
companies would reap financial rewards from such 
an exercise:
‘Most people just want to know what 
they’re paying for is efficient and that they’re 
getting good value for money [...]
the energy companies are making billions out of 
us, it doesn’t matter how energy efficient you are, 
they’re all creaming off
and making a fortune’ (R2, Rural B)
Participants also questioned the type of data to 
be collected. Anonymised data to establish trends 
and help smooth running of the network was seen 
as far more acceptable than data traceable to 
people or households. When talking about future 
developments, participants were often cynical over 
the extent to which change would be forced upon 
them, and what would be a positive choice actively 
taken. Participants wanted reassurance that there 
would be legislation in place to protect their data, 
prevent identity fraud, and that it would be used 
specifically to improve service and infrastructure. 
The benefits from data sharing would have to be 
evident.
Figure 11. Perceived risks and benefits associated with smart grids (post-workshop)
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The Groundswell scenario was viewed as a more 
realistic representation of 2050 in that it seemed 
sufficiently more advanced than either the 
Minimum Smart or Smart Power Sector scenarios. 
Despite further changes made to this scenario 
following the public workshops, the key finding, 
on the acceptability of spatial variation in types 
of technologies and services enabled via smart 
grids, remain largely applicable in this community-
led future. Participants were divided about how 
positive this version of the future was.
In terms of first impressions, groups liked the 
idea of getting a larger proportion of energy from 
renewable sources. Yet when introduced to the idea 
of spatial variation in the types of technologies 
available across the UK, participants were 
fundamentally uncomfortable with inequalities 
in access. The urban engaged group speculated 
that rural areas would suffer due to lack of access 
to services, but urban early adopters would 
pay higher prices for technologies that would 
later be rolled out nationally. The rural engaged 
groups held more pragmatic views of urban-
rural differences, drawing parallels with existing 
problems of access to high-speed broadband in 
remote areas. This group also suggested that those 
living in cities may be restricted too, for example, 
using a washing machine at off peak times may be 
limited due to potentially disturbing neighbours.
Although spatial variations in access concerned 
participants, they were more preoccupied by 
financial exclusion and the possible social 
repercussions. Participants could not see how 
those on lower incomes would be able to afford 
smart appliances, specialist services or an energy-
efficient home. Participants envisaged energy as 
an increasingly scarce and costly resource: the 
well-off remain unaffected while the majority is 
left to cut back, worsening existing social divisions. 
Given that many technologies portrayed also 
appear to be quite advanced compared with those 
existing today, participants also envisaged that 
older generations would struggle to adapt enough 
in order to understand and benefit from such 
developments. Vulnerable people may become 
anxious and be taken advantage of by companies, 
or miss out on potential benefits. 
The introduction of specialist companies offering 
services alongside power companies prompted 
concern over the degree of control they would 
have over consumers and access to personal data. 
Participants were wary of energy service firms, 
and this linked in to previous negative comments 
about the Big Six power companies. It was argued 
that the public would need to know the criteria by 
which they would operate: 
‘...it needs to be embedded in law so 
that [the local area] can’t suddenly be 
switched off with power simply just so 
[neighbouring town] can have a bit more 
[...] who is going to be in control?
(R4, Rural B)
The Smart 2050 scenario was viewed as much 
farther in the future than the other scenarios, and 
as ‘too much’, ‘too controlling’ and ‘confusing’. 
Automation of appliances was met with resistance 
as it was associated with a lack of control and an 
invasion of privacy:
‘I don’t want no company saying like ‘well 
right about now your machine’s not going 
to work because it’s high peak [...] it’s like it 
becomes to know your habits, it knows how 
you operate, that’s kind of scary’ 
(R1, Urban A)
There was particular concern around fridges 
being automated, a fault occurring and food being 
spoiled. As systems increased in complexity, the 
chance of things going wrong increased too for 
participants. External controls would have to take 
into account people’s varying needs (e.g. those with 
health problems). An override function would be 
essential, allowing consumers to take control if 
needed.
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Real-time tariffs were seen as too complicated, 
with participants already confused about the 
current energy market and the multitude of tariffs 
on offer. Yet, some mentioned Economy-7 systems 
as simple, practical and something everyone 
could understand. Experience with energy tariffs 
was in direct contrast to people’s experiences 
with mobile phone pricing which was more 
straightforward. Underlying all this was a lack 
of trust for institutions – insurance companies, 
banks, politicians – as well as the Big Six power 
companies.
This scenario also includes some community 
energy schemes. The idea of communities 
producing their own energy was well received, 
seen as a way of regaining control and making 
money by selling excess energy back to National 
Grid. One rural group speculated over how urban 
areas would fare as it was assumed they might 
not be socially cohesive enough for the scheme to 
work. The rural engaged group, who had extensive 
experience of generating their own energy, had 
already had problems with the distribution of 
profits. Nevertheless, the idea of becoming more 
self-sufficient was appealing and represented a 
more old-fashioned, sustainable way of life.
On the post-workshop questionnaire, participants 
indicated their preferred scenario. As shown 
in Figure 12, around half (53%) preferred the 
Groundswell scenario; the next most popular 
scenario was the Smart 2050 scenario, which was 
selected by 28% of participants. The reasons for 
choices made were also elicited (see Figure 13) 
where participants could select reasons from a 
broader range provided). The most popular reasons 
were environmental and financial, particularly 
allowing for more renewable energy sources and 
reducing energy bills. Reasons relating to system 
operation, supply security and market structure 
were less popular. Rural respondents (61.1%) were 
particularly likely to select increased renewable 
supply as the reason for their scenario choice, 
compared to urban respondents (38.9%). Those 
with smart grid-related experience (56.7%) were 
more likely to select ‘being able to reduce your 
energy use’ than were those without experience 
(43.3%), and to select ‘many (new) companies 
providing smart home services’ as a reason (72.7% 
vs. 27.3%).
Respondents were also asked about barriers that 
might stop their favourite scenario from becoming 
reality (again participants were able to select 
reasons from a broader range provided).
Figure 14 shows that the three barriers cited 
most frequently were: insufficient data protection 
measures, consumer unwillingness to share data, 
and insufficient financial savings for consumers.
Figure 12. Public workshop participants’ 
preferred scenario
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Further observations
 
The last part of discussions aimed to reveal public 
views on key trade-offs that are likely to shape 
the functions and capabilities enabled by smart 
grids (Box 6). The first such trade-off addressed 
the sharing of individuals’ energy use data in 
comparison with potential cost savings (i.e. the 
desire to protect privacy vs. the desire to reduce 
bills). The second examined the importance of 
renewable energy as opposed to the any-time 
availability of electricity at the same price. 
Regarding the first, participants wanted to see a 
more dynamic relationship where, if consumers 
shared information, they would be kept informed 
as to how it was used and what effective change 
it resulted in, as well as any gains or limitations 
observed over time. Some others argued that 
receiving financial benefits (i.e. reduced bills) in 
return would be a factor in their decision.
‘I think I would probably sit somewhere in 
the middle actually, I think I’d be reasonably 
comfortable with some information being made 
available and the trade-off being that I would 
get some kind of reduced cost’
(R1, Rural Eng B)
For some others, the decisive factor was whether 
they would receive clear benefit in return for 
sharing their data (via a ‘derived’ service [22], for 
example being able to monitor elderly relatives’ 
wellbeing), building on ‘motivated cognition’ theory 
[23].
In the case of the second trade-off, it is interesting 
to note that for some participants having lots of 
renewable electricity in the system was regarded 
as a desirable ‘end goal’ and that they had very 
little understanding of the implications of this at a 
system level.
Whilst many participants recognised the 
environmental benefits of renewable electricity, 
they did not want to be restricted in their energy 
use, as their daily needs may be unpredictable.
Participants also discussed the reliability of 
advanced communication systems, especially in 
the context of physical geography. Based on past 
experiences, there were comments on how physical 
geography might limit the capacity of transmitters 
and what would it mean for the reliability of 
energy supplies. In addition, over-reliance on 
electricity was also raised, with concerns emerging 
over whether this would reduce security of supply.
A final observation relates to trust and perception 
of power companies. Mistrust towards power 
companies was more common in non-engaged 
communities than in engaged ones. Participants 
in one group, engaged in an active community 
scheme, explained how they have managed to keep 
their energy bills the same in recent years despite 
increases in the price of energy. Rather than 
appearing resentful, they discussed these issues 
much more neutrally, which may reflect a feeling 
of empowerment regarding their energy use.
Box 6. Exploration of trade-offs in the public workshops
Privacy vs. Cost Savings: To keep your bills down, the companies that operate the networks (NOT 
power companies – although they may need this information in future) would like to know more 
about the way you use energy. We do not have to share this information but if we do, it will help to 
keep our bills down.
Clean Electricity vs. Any-Time Use: As we have more wind turbines to generate clean electricity, we may 
have to fit some of our electricity use into the time when most wind is blowing. This may mean using 
things like washing machines, tumble dryers and dishwashers when our smart meters say it’s okay 
to run them.
UKERC Research Report
Scenarios for the Development of Smart Grids in the UK
57
Figure 13. Reasons for preferred scenario (% of participants)
Figure 14. Perceived barriers to realising preferred scenario (% of participants)
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4.2 Spatial implications
Our scenarios portray alternative pathways into 
the future where new types of electricity demand 
(via electrification of heat and transport) and 
sources of supply (via distributed generation, 
including PV) are integrated into the UK 
electricity networks. This presents multiple 
interdependencies: on the one hand policy 
incentives, market forces and consumer appetite 
are likely to determine where, at what speed and 
to what degree LCTs will be deployed. In turn, the 
net loads (i.e. the difference between consumption 
and generation sources) at the distribution 
networks will be different because it is unlikely 
that the same supply and demand sources will 
be deployed uniformly across the country. For 
example, whilst ground-source heat pumps may 
appear in rural areas off the gas grid, EVs may 
emerge in semi-urban areas, perhaps initially as a 
second car. Furthermore, a key issue in the early 
stages of deployment is local clustering of these 
technologies, as was evidenced by the growth of PV 
installations (Figure 15). 
These technologies have impacts, most 
significantly, in low voltage networks. If the load 
experienced on a network reaches its maximum 
rating, investment will be needed to release 
additional headroom. Smart solutions such as DSR 
can play a significant role in avoiding or deferring 
costly investment in upgrading substation capacity. 
In return for shifting the time they use some 
part of their electrical demand to another time 
consumers may have the opportunity to access 
lower energy tariffs. The corollary of this is that 
consumers who cannot shift their demand may 
pay higher tariffs for energy used in periods of 
high demand. Some consumers may be unwilling 
or unable to shift their consumption (an obvious 
example would be vulnerable consumers who 
require heating throughout the day) and thus may 
see price rises. Inability to shift energy demand 
might also be due to economic circumstances, for 
example not having the capital to access smart 
technologies.
Figure 15. Number of domestic PV 
installations per 10,000 households by 
local authorities, as at end of June 2013 
Source: Ofgem E-serve database (as of 30.06.2013)
Notes: 1) There are 14,496 domestic PV installations 
that have not been allocated to Local Authorities due to 
missing locational references. 2) For Scotland, areas are 
represented as Council Areas. 
Legend
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An emerging literature on social issues points to 
a further risk that the availability of smart grid 
technologies and services might be perceived 
exclusive to homeowners only [24]. Indeed, an 
often-overlooked issue is that whilst 30% of the 
UK population lives in rented properties, in some 
areas tenants constitute more than half of the 
population (Figure 16).
Some consumers whose consumption patterns 
already fit the low demand profile may benefit but 
this would not deliver significant system benefits. 
The key uncertainty here regarding effectiveness 
is whether the different possible tariffs that might 
come to market can engender behaviour change, 
but there is also an issue as to the social impacts 
that might arise; will the adoption of new tariffs 
lead to more or less fuel poverty and associated 
impacts such as health? [25].
In addition to interactions between individual 
households and their ability to take up 
the opportunities presented by DSR, other 
infrastructural, geographical, network and socio-
structural characteristics might affect the spatial 
distribution of smart grid functions. Experts 
articulated that some smart energy system 
functions like DSR technologies, active load 
management and controllability are more likely 
to be in urban than rural areas. However, given a 
significant variation in energy use between urban 
and rural areas (Figure 17), including fuel source 
(or access to the gas grid), socio-economic variation 
and characteristics of the built environment, it 
is not known whether such factors can help or 
hinder the adoption of LCTs as well as how these 
technologies might affect these differences in 
the future. However, a guaranteed outcome is 
that deployment of LCTs will be layered on top 
of these disparities, resulting in a more spatially 
differentiated and diversified electricity system.
The literature on how urban and rural energy 
systems might be reshaped and reconstituted as 
a result of these changes in the future is in its 
infancy and we have not had the scope to explore 
these issues in detail. Key research questions 
include: at what level of variable generation 
does DSR become essential and would this vary 
depending on location (and if so, how)? What types 
of households are most responsive to DSR signals? 
How does the value of DSR change when it is used 
to address local congestion vs. national balancing? 
Figure 16. Distribution of population living 
in rented housing (2011) (%)
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS) and National 
Records of Scotland (NRS)
Legend
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What are the implications of controlling energy 
demand as well as supply and storage at a local 
level? What impacts might different EV battery-
charging arrangements have upon electricity 
networks at both local and national levels?
There is limited research on the impact of LCTs 
on load growth and associated investment needs 
in the distribution networks [9], and so further 
research is needed. EA Technology (2012) assesses 
the impact of LCT uptake for prototype networks 
at extra high voltage, high voltage and low voltage 
levels for urban, suburban and rural areas. Whilst 
there is limited scope to anticipate how consumers 
will actually respond to these technologies and 
services (due to the ‘action-value gap’), further 
research is needed to identify the nature and 
scope of this uncertainty, as well as how to utilise 
these differences to deliver effective, efficient and 
equitable outcomes rather than deepening existing 
inequalities.
Figure 17. Residential energy use per 10,000 
households by local authorities by different 
geographies (2011, GWh) (%)
Source: Urban vs rural split is based on Office for Na-
tional Statistics (ONS) and National Records of Scotland 
(NRS), Energy Data is based on [26]
Notes: For Scotland, areas are represented as Council 
Areas.
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The research reveals a high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the future of smart grids in the UK. 
This applies not only to the general public, but 
also to those working in and with the industry, 
for whom stronger vision and leadership in the 
long-term would reduce risk, uncertainty and 
expense substantially. Some of this uncertainty 
might reasonably be expected to be mitigated 
by coordinated government action but some will 
require sectoral stakeholders to respond with 
new approaches to risk management and adopt 
new business models to address the ‘broken value 
chain’ problem.
The need for government transparency and long-
term predictability applies equally to drivers for 
a smart grid: solid commitment to renewable 
energy targets to 2030 and beyond, for example, 
is essential if the infrastructure of the future is to 
accommodate much more unpredictable and more 
decentralised power flows and the technologies 
needed to manage them.
The following section summarises key issues that 
will affect the direction and pace of smart grid 
development in the UK. Section 2 relates previous 
UK smart grid scenarios to ours. Section 3 focuses 
on the implications of our scenarios by identifying 
key messages for decision makers across 
government, industry and business.
5.1 Characterising determinants 
of smart grid development in the 
UK
Building on extensive stakeholder engagement 
via expert interviews, online surveys, an expert 
workshop and public deliberative workshops, 
this project portrays alternative scenarios for 
the development of smart grids in the UK. Below 
we highlight a number of key issues that will 
determine which of these pathways might be 
realised in the coming decades in smartening the 
UK’s electricity grid:
The benefits and pitfalls of smart grids. Although our 
surveys show that experts agreed on the need to 
make electrical delivery smarter, and that smart 
grids can afford various benefits – particularly cost 
savings, network balancing, facilitating renewables 
and emissions reduction – many also see smart 
grid solutions as unproven, underdeveloped, 
complex and difficult to implement. Consumer 
engagement and demand management were 
identified as benefits, but consumer resistance was 
also considered a risk. Data protection and privacy 
were identified as problematic, demanding greater 
transparency and data protection safeguards to 
gain customer trust.
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Uncertainty. The development of smart grids 
involves many different elements within the 
electricity supply industry and the wider world. 
Action to reduce uncertainty would enhance the 
ability of all stakeholders to plan more effectively. 
We found that many stakeholders felt uncertainty 
over how the expected expansion of new energy 
technologies might shape networks, and that 
this makes it difficult for them to make definitive 
assessments, even over the next decade (relating 
directly to the 2015-2023 operating period of RIIO-
ED1). No stakeholders felt able to evaluate future 
network needs or their evolution beyond 2025.
This throws up the question of how regulation 
would need to evolve alongside developing 
technology and market services. Experience 
suggests that it would have to take into account 
changing circumstances on an ongoing basis. 
Reducing uncertainty is not a straightforward 
matter. A national smart grid coordinator might 
have responsibility for identifying and shaping 
policy to mitigate risk. To be effective this would 
have to be able to influence policy at both Ofgem 
and DECC.
Risk management. Since privatisation DNOs have 
existed in a regulatory framework that has 
rewarded gradual increases in efficiency with little 
incentive for innovation since it was seen as largely 
unnecessary. System-wide adoption of low carbon 
technologies is likely to change the demands 
on the networks and regulation has begun to 
change to reflect that. DNO behaviour will have 
to change with it, to invest in new technologies, 
strengthen their skills base, and make decisions 
based on developing networks which may need to 
handle integrated generation and increased and 
more volatile consumer demand – with limited 
information on when and by how much this might 
happen.
Coordination. As was also raised by the IET [28], 
overall coordination of activities is central to 
making sure smart grids happen and to ensuring 
potential conflict arising across the disparate 
elements of the electricity supply industry does 
not provide additional barriers to uptake. Concerns 
have been raised about a lack of vision in planning 
for smart grid development beyond 2020, with 
DECC singled out in particular as needing to 
provide more of a coherent lead.
Long-term policy. Predictable and sustained policy 
support is widely held to be essential for the 
deployment of LCTs, and it is likely that similar 
support for smart grids would create clearer 
investment conditions for the developers of 
the relevant technologies. Long-term policy 
commitment across the wider policy environment 
relevant to smart grids would be likely to 
contribute significantly to enhanced investor 
confidence. This is in relation to both the smart 
grid drivers (such as growth in renewables) as well 
as regulation to drive innovation and investment 
amongst network operators.
Organisational frameworks. The systematic 
rolling out of learning from Low Carbon 
Networks Fund projects (along with others) 
and their commercialisation will require 
proper incentivisation and the right investment 
conditions. Experts expressed concern around 
the capacity of DNOs both to invest in research 
initiatives and to roll out any innovative output 
from these programmes on a systematic basis. 
Since this is primarily an investment issue it 
may be necessary for DNOs to look for ways to 
do this and, at the same time, for Ofgem to give 
appropriate incentives which take into account any 
associated risk and benefits. Here as in other areas, 
the scope may be limited by what Ofgem will allow 
as much as the appetite of the DNOs to find new 
ways of doing things.
Markets. Finding ways of enabling new entrants 
and new services is essential. A market 
framework which allows new providers to offer 
new services more easily is likely to stimulate 
the kinds of innovation required for greater 
systemic smartness. This might include new 
supply companies, energy service companies, 
aggregators and DSOs depending on the evolution 
of the system and how investors respond. The 
current market is dominated by the Big Six, which 
has led to problems including market illiquidity 
and other disincentives to new entrants to the 
sector. Additional barriers to market entry by 
new small companies may include economies of 
scale, network charges, low sectoral margins and 
the complexity of regulation. The UK’s ongoing 
Electricity Market Reform expresses concern and 
a desire for action to address this but questions 
have been raised around whether EMR as currently 
proposed will be successful. 
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Public acceptability. The public is ambivalent 
about smart grids, perceiving them to afford both 
benefits and risks. The most popular scenario was 
Groundswell, followed by the Smart 2050 scenario, 
with reasons relating to the environmental and 
financial benefits (e.g. more renewables, lower 
bills). Participants were able to envisage modifying 
their behaviour in order to use electricity from 
renewable sources, but with the proviso that 
they could override the system when necessary. 
However, in contrast there was a common 
view that the decision should be taken out of 
consumers’ hands as part of a government-led 
green strategy.
Consumer data access. Smart meters will generate 
large volumes of data. The usefulness of this 
data in allowing better network management will 
depend on who has access to it, how long access 
is able to continue after the data is generated 
and whether it is geographically specific. At the 
same time there are significant concerns over the 
protection of data, its security and over consumer 
rights to privacy, confirming findings in the 
wider literature. Current negative perceptions of 
the Big Six power companies greatly influenced 
participants’ attitudes towards data sharing (and 
to personal energy-related behavioural change). 
On the other hand, a Eurobarometer survey from 
2011 indicates that two thirds of the UK population 
is unaware of the existence of a national public 
authority responsible for protecting their personal 
data rights [29]. Hence, there is a risk of both 
the exploitation of uninformed consumers who 
unintentionally give away more information 
than they are aware of, and for the imposition of 
unnecessary limits on accessing data from willing 
consumers. Again, communicating the benefits 
of data access to the public, ideally via a source 
perceived as neutral, is likely to have substantial 
long-term system benefits, particularly if this 
process is transparent.
Consumer buy-in. Securing public commitment, 
although challenging, is perceived by virtually 
all stakeholders as essential to opening up 
network services able to respond to a future 
system with substantial intermittent generation 
and increasingly volatile load. Rather than just 
‘flicking a switch’ it is expected that the public 
will be able to choose from more differentiated 
and dynamic tariffs, become accustomed to 
operating new technologies and shifting their 
energy use. Whilst incentives may play a role, the 
communication of why these changes are needed 
and the role of power companies in this transition 
is equally important. Our research suggests that 
early communication of the benefits of smart grid 
capabilities, the establishment of effective delivery 
mechanisms (especially for the demand response 
market) and finding ways of ensuring that benefits 
flow to consumers are all likely to play a part in 
encouraging household participation.
Energy citizenship. Community energy may help to 
foster energy citizenship. Our public workshops 
revealed more positive attitudes towards 
functions and services offered by smart grids in 
communities with active energy schemes. These 
can play an important part in communicating 
smart grids benefits as well as addressing issues 
around mistrust towards power companies and 
government by fostering energy citizenship and 
empowering local communities.
Value proposition for consumers. Synergies with 
other smart systems may help to build a stronger 
case for smart grids in the eyes of consumers. 
For the majority of the UK population ‘disclosing 
personal information is an increasing part of 
modern life’; 65% of UK citizens are aware of the 
need to disclose personal information so they can 
access new products or services [29]. Our workshop 
findings also support the view that if householders’ 
data is used to deliver a service that contributes to 
their quality of life (e.g. being able to monitor their 
elderly relatives), they are more likely to share 
it. The development of joined-up thinking across 
policy areas as well as integrated services across 
energy, transport and healthcare domains, could 
not only generate cross-cutting efficiencies but 
might help alleviate consumer concerns on data 
privacy. An implication might be that this approach 
could be applied across different scales, from 
smart homes to smart communities and cities.
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Distribution of costs and benefits. Moving from a 
system where the cost of delivering each additional 
unit of electricity is averaged across all consumers 
to one that reflects actual costs could have 
important social implications. It has been observed 
that this might lead to different electricity prices 
even on neighbouring streets, depending on the 
constraints on the grid at a given time [30]. It is 
vital that the costs are not perceived by the public 
to be unevenly spread, and the same applies to the 
benefits: many members of the public we spoke 
to felt that future changes would be designed 
simply to maximise power company profits. 
There are of course competing notions of what 
constitutes an appropriate distribution of costs, 
and adding these costs to bills may well be at odds 
with the objectives of fuel poverty campaigners. 
However, a perception that the costs of developing 
a smart grid are being borne inequitably would 
undoubtedly hinder the process.
Spatial differences. Experts articulated that smart 
energy system functions like DSR technologies, 
active load management and controllability would 
be more likely to be implemented in urban than 
non-urban areas, compounding current physical, 
socio-structural and infrastructural differences. 
There is a need for a better understanding of the 
two-way relationship between these inequalities 
and the uptake of various smart technologies and 
services. In order to avoid the widening of these 
differences, more research is needed to address 
how smart energy delivery would shape these 
differences and vice versa. More research is needed 
so as to understand fully where and how the 
distributional impacts of smarter energy delivery 
are likely to fall, and how policy intervention could 
be used to avoid exacerbating existing inequalities.
5.2 Relevance to other UK smart 
grid scenarios
Building on the Carbon Plan’s [6] examination of 
the uptake of LCTs at a national level, the Smart 
Grid Forum developed scenarios [9] on smart grid 
development in the UK, along with an associated 
modelling tool to assist DNOs in the preparation of 
their business plans for RIIO-ED1. Based on 2012 
data, each of these scenarios assumes different 
levels of LCT uptake and DSR. Generation profiles 
follow the National Grid scenarios [6] where 
Scenarios 0, 1 and 2 are aligned with the ‘Gone 
Green’ scenario whilst Scenario 3 adheres to less 
ambitious decarbonisation of supply as portrayed 
in ‘Slow Progression’.
Scenario 3 is most consistent with the Minimum 
Smart scenario in this report, where existing inertia 
in the system and a lack of strong policy incentives 
for decarbonisation, coupled with less interest 
from the public, results in renewable energy and 
climate targets being missed and the need to 
purchase international carbon credits (Table 3). 
Scenario 0 draws the upper boundary as portrayed 
in our Smart 2050 scenario. Scenarios 1 and 2 have 
the same level of LCT uptake but different levels 
of customer engagement with DSR (lower in the 
latter). This therefore places them in the same 
areas as the Groundswell and Smart Power Sector 
scenarios respectively.
Our work builds on these ENA scenarios, but there 
is scope to explore the quantitative aspects in more 
detail. By drawing on existing literature and expert 
knowledge, consistent with the overall framework 
of these scenarios, our scenarios indicate how 
interactions across policy, regulatory, commercial, 
financial, behavioural, organisational and technical 
factors might lead to one scenario versus another 
one. It is expected that the socio-technical 
framework we have adopted in our scenarios will 
help with the understanding of implications of 
key decisions for the decision-makers (whether 
in policy, industry or business) to avoid any 
unintended consequences, given the significant 
costs and benefits of smart grid technologies and 
the challenges ahead.
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5.3 Key messages
This section contains a small number of key 
messages that have emerged from this research 
and the construction of the accompanying 
scenarios. These messages could either form the 
foundations of future research, or be addressed 
by various stakeholder groups or policymakers. 
Smart grids in the UK are currently at such an 
early stage in their evolution that a wide range of 
developmental pathways is available. A corollary of 
this uncertainty, however, is the opportunity that 
exists for shaping the direction the industry takes.
The need to develop a set of indicators in order 
to measure progress. The range of scenarios 
described in this report demonstrates that 
diverse outcomes are credible. These would be 
expected to have very different consequences 
for the achievement of government policy goals 
with regard to decarbonisation, security of supply 
and affordability. Furthermore, examining the 
‘wildcard’ impacts reveals that there could 
be critical ‘branching points’ on the scenario 
pathways that may result in what was previously a 
satisfactory pathway flipping to an unsatisfactory 
one. The multi-faceted interdependencies between 
supply chains, consumer engagement, time lags 
between investment decisions and build-up 
of infrastructure etc. raises the need to have a 
sufficient vision to know whether we are following 
a pathway consistent with our goals.
Ensuring equitable outcomes. Smarter energy 
delivery promises to enable more efficient use of 
energy infrastructure through the introduction of 
differentiated tariffs and demand side response 
programmes. However, our research reveals 
that the distribution of benefits is unlikely to be 
uniform within and across different geographical 
settings. 
Due to differences in lifestyles, socio-economic 
characteristics, education levels and normative 
constraints, consumers’ ability and willingness 
to accept smart technology and services might 
vary within the same geographical settings. On 
the other hand, different smart grid functions 
and capabilities (albeit at different costs) might 
be enabled in different geographical settings 
as a result of physical, socio-structural and 
infrastructural differences. The development of 
business models, policy tools and measures to 
manage these differences, rather than widen them, 
is an important area for further research, as public 
perceptions here can act as a strong driver or 
barrier (see below).
Public engagement. Public workshop participants 
perceived more of the benefits from smart 
grids accruing to private companies, with more 
risks and/or costs accruing to consumers and 
society – that is, power companies, not ‘ordinary 
people’, will be the ones to benefit from smart 
technologies. Although we found that the public 
does generally see the lifestyle benefits of smart 
technologies, it is critical to build trust and 
repair the widespread negative perception of 
the industry so that lacklustre public opinion – 
or even outright opposition – does not impede 
smart grid progress. Our results also highlight the 
importance of community energy schemes for 
engaging the public with a smart grid transition: 
first, communities with an active energy scheme 
expressed less resentment towards power 
companies; secondly the scenario which had the 
most public support was Groundswell where strong 
community engagement is the key characteristic. 
This highlights the importance of building public 
trust in a way in which consumers do not feel they 
bear the risks and/or costs whilst not receiving the 
benefits.
Joined-up thinking across smart systems to generate 
consumer buy-in. The utilisation of opportunities 
and benefits offered via ‘smart energy’ delivery 
requires a shift from the traditional ‘supply and 
predict’ paradigm for both consumers and energy 
providers. Both our research and the emerging 
literature indicate that in order for consumers 
to share their data, there needs to be clear and 
demonstrable benefits of doing so. Whilst lower 
bills may motivate some, others would like to 
see how doing so contributes to their daily lives 
beyond limited financial savings (e.g. being able 
to monitor elderly parent’s wellbeing from smart 
metering data). Hence, a way to initiate consumer 
buy-in and interest could be via offering integrated 
services within energy, transport or healthcare 
domains. Such an approach would require new 
working relationships and business models across 
the energy industry, business, information and 
communications technology (ICT) companies and 
other new entrants. Expert interviews revealed that 
the current advisory body, the Smart Grid Forum, 
is a good starting point, but that more needs to be 
done; for example, the development of a regulatory 
architecture that removes and addresses 
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systemic barriers, and the addition of consumer 
representation in the Forum itself. Further research 
could be carried out to further the understanding 
of how smart grids can form the foundations of 
wider smart systems, such as smart communities 
and cities.
Risk, innovation and investment. Network operators 
are historically risk-averse, aiming to provide 
a highly reliable service with little scope or 
incentive for innovation. The emerging challenges 
to the electricity system will require different 
behaviour, with innovation coming to the fore 
to allow minimisation of costs. This implies 
greater risk and network operators will need 
to be sufficiently incentivised to take risks and 
innovate, in so doing generating learning effects. 
This in turn should reduce associated investment 
risks, which will need to be mitigated as far as 
possible to keep overall costs down. Risk aversion 
was seen as the single most important barrier to 
smart technology investments. Uncertainty over 
return on investment, particularly when caused 
by ambiguous government signals and regulatory 
instability, heightens investment risk and pushes 
up the cost of large infrastructure projects. A risk 
management approach therefore needs to be 
adopted across the whole range of actors, including 
government. Changes in culture are not limited to 
the network operators.
The potential for limitations from regulation was 
also noted; the regulator will need to be open to 
and willing to allow network operators to run 
greater risks.
Identifying no-regrets technology solutions could help to 
mitigate uncertainty. The possibility of very diverse 
futures raises the question of whether or not there 
could be some no-regrets technology solutions 
that can help to manage less-ideal situations. The 
Smart Power Sector scenario shows that balancing 
the grid may become more difficult in the absence 
of widespread demand side response. Bearing 
in mind the long lead times of infrastructure 
investments in the power sector, technologies 
like distributed storage or smart charging could 
be used as a part of a mitigation strategy. Further 
work needs to be undertaken in this area to 
identify such technology solutions and develop 
ways to support their commercialisation.
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